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CRIMINAL LAW
REFLECTIONS ON THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN CHINA
JEROME ALAN COHEN*

I

4

Once a head is chopped off, history shows it can't
be restored, nor can it grow again as chives do,
after being cut. If you cut off a head by mistake,
there is no way to rectify the mistake, even if you
want to.
Mao Tse-tung
We Americans, who have always traveled
widely and brought with us a missionary zeal
to spread our own values, have never gladly
suffered the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction over our nationals. We have also taken
keen interest in how other countries treat their
own nationals accused of crime. Americans
have been concerned about the criminal process in China ever since our first ship-"The
Empress of China"-entered the port of Canton in 1784. The captain of that American
trading vessel joined French, Dutch and Danish
counterparts in supporting the British East
India Company's vain attempt to resist China's
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a sailor
charged with homicide against a Chinese.1 In
1821, the captain of an American merchantman
proved equally unsuccessful in an effort to
protect an Italian-born crew member against
being tried by Chinese authorities on a similar
charge. 2 In both cases the accused was found
guilty and executed by strangulation.
Such incidents, although rare, fueled the
increasing desire of the Western trading nations to exempt their nationals from China's
administration of justice, which they did not
* Professor of Law, Director of East Asian Legal
Studies and Associate Dean, Harvard Law School.
This essay was originally prepared as the third in the
series of three Julius Rosenthal Lectures, delivered
by Professor Cohen at the Northwestern University
School of Law, April 5-7, 1976.
t Mao Tse-tung, Speech on the Ten Major Relationships (April 25, 1956); reprinted in 20 PEKING REV.
10, 21 (No. 1, 1977).
1
See, e.g., 1 H. MORSE, THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 102-03 (1910).
2 Id. at 104-05.

hesitate to characterize as "barbarous,"' even
though Chinese officials sought to win their
good will by only asserting jurisdiction when a
Chinese had been killed and by swiftly and
sternly punishing Chinese who committed offenses against Westerners.' Following Britain's
victory in the Opium War of 1839, a badly-

weakened China concluded treaties with many
states surrendering her right to exercise territorial jurisdiction over their nationals. 5 By
granting to foreigners the privileged status of
"extraterritoriality" these "unequal treaties" introduced, and increasingly symbolized, what
the Chinese Communists have called China's
"century of humiliation."
Western complaints about Chinese justice
were not primarily directed against the substantive criminal law's proscription of various kinds
of conduct. Although the East India Company's
Canton Select Committee charged in 1806 that
"the

Chinese

...

laws ...

are

not only

very arbitrary and corruptly administered, but
founded on a system in many respects incompaiible with European ideas of equity or justice," 6 the leading Western expert on Chinese
law, Sir George Staunton, found much to
praise in the Manchu Dynasty's criminal code,
even while denouncing as "indefensible" some
of the principles of its administration. 7 More
3Id. at 109.
4 Edwards, Ch'ing LegalJurisdictionOver Foreigners,
in ESSAYS ON CHINA'S LEGAL TRADITION (J. Cohen,

F. Chen, and R. Edwards ed., publication forthcoming).
5 Many of the treaties are collected in 1 G.
HERTSLET,

HERTSLET'S CHINA

TREATIES

(3d ed.,

1908). For the text of the 1844 treaty between the
United States and China, see 6 C. BEVANS (ed.),
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 at 647

(1971).
6 3 H.

MORSE,

CHRONICLES OF THE EAST INDIA

COMPANY TO CHINA,

7

See, G.

1635-1834 at 40(1926).
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important than the differences between the
code's homicide proscriptions and the comparable norms of Western countries was the fact
that in practice Chinese magistrates sometimes
applied the code in ways that seemed, to the
Westerners, to ignore provisions that justified
killing in lawful self-defense or that only required payment of a fine for killing by unavoidable accident.8 Many Westerners became convinced that it was impossible for foreign defendants to have an impartial trial. They bitterly complained that China had devised special, truncated procedures for the prosecution
of foreigners, and they believed that, in cases
where a Chinese had been killed by a foreigner,
Chinese judges acted according to an "innate
conviction that their countrymen, belonging to
a civilized race, must be in the right as against
those of rude and unlettered origin."9
But Western dissatisfaction derived from far
more than China's perceived anti-foreign bias.
It went to the very heart of the Chinese system
for administering justice. Even in treating
Chinese defendants that system seemed to presume that anyone unsavory enough to be accused of a crime must be guilty. It denied an
accused the aid of counsel, a fair opportunity
to rebut the charges and a privilege against
self-incrimination; indeed, it generally insisted
upon a confession as a prerequisite to conviction, and authorized the infliction of torture to
assure that confession would be forthcoming.
In these circumstances one can share the conclusion of earlier commentators that "the trial

OF CHINA XXiV (1810):

There are certainly many points upon which
these laws are altogether indefensible. We shall
look in vain, for instance, for those excellent
principles of the English law, by which every
man is presumed innocent until he is proved
guilty; and no man required to incriminate
himself. Such maxims the Chinese system neither does nor indeed could recognize. But it
will scarcely escape observation, that there are
other parts of the code which, in a considerable
degree, compensate these and similar defects,
are altogether of a different complexion, and
are perhaps not unworthy of imitation, even
among the fortunate and enlightened nations
of the West.
8 1 H. MORSE, supra note 1, at I10-11.
9 Id. at 112. See also, Edwards, supra note 4, for a
discussion of the special procedures for exercising
jurisdiction over foreigners, which China had originally designed in an effort to improve relations with
them.
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was more for the purpose of publicly establishing the charge and determining the penalty,
than of ascertaining the truth."'°
Moreover, in their prosecution of foreigners,
Chinese officials were so zealous in fulfilling
the doctrine of responsibility that often required "a life for a life" that they did not even
appear fastidious about whether the foreigner
who was surrendered for trial was in fact the
person whose act had resulted in the death in
question. And, in order to make certain that
someone would be turned over for punishment, the authorities did not hesitate to shut
off all of a recalcitrant country's trade or to
arrest and detain one or more representatives
of the ship or trading company involved until
the demand for an accused was met."' The
Opium War and the system of extraterritorial
jurisdiction imposed by the victors were at least
in part the result of Western dissatisfaction
with China's administration of justice.
The Chinese people came to detest the extraterritorial system, and part of the price of
ending it was their adoption of formal Westernstyle legal institutions. Japan had succeeded in
throwing off the yoke of extraterritoriality by
modernizing its legal system at the end of the
nineteenth century, and this inspired China to
follow a similar path. 2 Beginning in 1902 the
major Western powers provided China with a
substantial incentive to undertake the vast effort "to reform its judicial system and to bring
it into accord with that of Western nations;" in
a series of bilateral treaties they promised that,
if China did so, they "will also be prepared to
relinquish extraterritorial rights when satisfied
that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant it .
1..",3During the last
decade of imperial rule and then, after the
Revolution of 1911, under the succeeding governments of the Republic of China, the country's leaders sought to "modernize" their law in
the hope of not only putting an end to extrater10 1 H. MORSE, supra note I at 114, citing T.
189 (1905).
11See I H. MORSE, supra note I at 99-109; Edwards,

JERNIGAN, CHINA IN LAW AND COMMERCE

supra note 4. Both writers review the cases of China's
assertion of criminal jurisdiction over Westerners.
"See I COHEN & CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1974).
13Treaty Respecting Commercial Relations, United
States-China, Oct. 8, 1903, art. XV [1903] 33
Stat. 2208, T.S. No. 430. See also 1 G. HERTSLET,
supra note 5, at 575.
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ritoriality but also facilitating political and economic development. Among the vicissitudes of
warlord struggles for power from 1916 to 1928
and Communist revolution and Japanese invasion after the Nationalists nominally unified
the country in 1928, the Republican government managed to Westernize China's law codes
and gradually do away with extraterritoriality,
despite the fact that it made only limited progress in translating the new legislation into actual
practice.
When in 1943 the United States and the
United Kingdom, the last of the powers to
retain extraterritorial jurisdiction, finally surrendered their privileged position, 14 they did
so under the political pressures of sustaining a
strained wartime alliance with Chiang Kaishek's Republican government more than out
of satisfaction with that government's administration of justice. Even to this day Americans
continue to be concerned about the quality of
criminal justice on the island of Taiwan, to
which the Republican government was forced
to flee in 1949 after its defeat in the Communist
revolution, just as they are concerned about
the administration of justice in many other
countries with which the United States is allied.
Because of this concern, not only United States
diplomats, but also all members of the United
States military Assistance Advisory Group stationed in Taiwan are exempt from the local
jurisdiction by virtue of diplomatic immunity.
Other U.S. military personnel in Taiwan and
their dependents and civilian employees enjoyed this full immunity until 1966; since then,
under the terms of a bilateral "status of forces"
agreement similar to those the U.S. has negotiated with other allies, in most cases they have
continued to be spared the exercise of Chinese
criminal jurisdiction; and, when brought before a Chinese court, they are "guaranteed
most of the procedural safeguards considered
fundamental to American justice," safeguards
that are denied to Chinese nationals who are
tried by the same court.15 In order to avoid
political friction, the Republic of China (ROC),
14Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related
Matters, United States-Republic of China, Jan.
11, 1943, (1943) 57 Stat. 767, T.S. No. 984. See also, 6
C. BEVANS, supra note 5 at 739.
'5 Lung-sheng Tao, The Sino-American Status of
Forces Agreement: Criminal Jurisdiction Over American
Soldiers on NationalistChinese Territory, 51 B.U.L. REv.
1, 29 (1971), summarizing the situation and providing
further citations.

like many other countries, also has minimized
its use of the criminal process against ordinary
American citizens and has treated those whom
16
it has prosecuted with considerable leniency.
These measures have been rather successful in
preventing a repetition of the series of diplomatic disputes generated by the exercise of
Chinese criminal jurisdiction over aliens during
the decades preceding the imposition of extraterritoriality. Yet, because of the treatment that
the ROC, our longtime ally and recipient of
American military aid, accords to its own nationals accused of crime, concern about the
administration of justice on Taiwan continues
17
to be voiced in the United States.
The establishment in 1949 of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) heightened the dissatisfaction of Americans and other Westerners
with the administration of justice on the mainland. Almost immediately, the United States
government expressed its "grave concern" over
the "arbitrary" detention in Mukden of five
American consular officials, who were subsequently found guilty at a "so-called trial"-apparently of assault upon a Chinese-and sentenced to further imprisonment which was
commuted to deportation; and, soon after, a
16 See, F. Man-ling Li, Recent Judicial Decisions
Concerning Treatment of Aliens in the Republic of
China (unpublished essay on file in the East Asian
Studies Library at the Harvard Law School).
" See, e.g., Security Assistance to Asia for FY '78,
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, REPORT OF A SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO ASIA,

April 8-

21, 1977, Comm. Print, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. Uune
19, 1977) summarizing political dissidents' claims of
arbitrary justice, torture, political control of the judiciary and detention of certain persons for 25 years.
See also, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1976, at 46 (the full
page advertisement "Stop Secret Execution In Taiwan.") No execution subsequently took place, and
"there have been no reports of execution of political
prisoners [in Taiwan] for many years." U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN COUNTRIES
RECEIVING U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 6 (1977). But

this State Department document notes that "there
are still occasional reports that investigative agencies
resort to torture or the beating of prisoners," that
constitutionally prescribed rights "have been circumscribed for a 'temporary period,"' that the ROC
does not permit independent verification of the num-

ber of political detainees held under emergency measures, and that under martial law, courts-martial
have sentenced to death common civilian criminals
in addition to trying political and military offenders.
Id. at 5-6. For further discussion of the current
situation in the ROC, see the text accompanying
notes 138 to 152 infra, and see generally HUMAN
RIGHTS IN TAIWAN, a monthly journal of the U.S.based Formosan Association for Human Rights.
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Mukden "people's court" heard charges against
an "American spy ring" and sentenced all nonChinese members of the U.S. Consulate General to deportation, without having named
them at the "trial."'" During the Korean War,
the PRC's espionage convictions of a number
of Americans and other foreigners gave rise to
further misgivings. In 1954, in the best known
case of this genre-the sentencing to life imprisonment and twenty years, respectively, of
CIA agents John Downey and Richard
Fecteau-the U.S. branded the convictions "a
most flagrant violation of justice" based upon
"trumped-up charges,'" a claim that President
Richard Nixon implicitly repudiated in 1973.20
However well-founded the PRC's accusations
may have been in certain cases, many observers
were disturbed by the breadth of new China's
few criminal statutes, especially the dragnet
legislation for the punishment of counterrevolution, which had provided the basis for the
espionage prosecutions and which embraces
even acts that occurred prior to its promulgation and acts analogous to those that it proscribes .2 1 Furthermore, the procedures employed against both foreign and Chinese accused, resulting in years of preconviction detention in many cases, multiple pressures to
confess and lack of a meaningful opportunity
to make a defense, drew widespread criticism
abroad 22 And, in dealing with its own nation18 For the details of these related incidents, see
Briggs, American ConsularRights in Communist China,

44 AM. J. INT'L L. 243 (1950).
1931 DEP'T STATE BULL. 856-57 (1954). For discussion of the case, seeJ. Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward
International Law-and Our Own, in CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND
TIVES
20 282, 289-90 (J. Cohen ed. 1970).

PERSPEC-

See COHEN & CHiU, supra note

12, at 641.
21 Act of the PRC for Punishment of Counterrevolution, promulgated Feb. 21, 1951, in I CHUNG-HUA
JEN-MIN

CHENG-FU FA-LING HUI-PIEN

(Collection of

Laws and Decrees of the Chinese People's Government) 3-5 [hereinafter cited as COLLECTION]; English
translation in J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963 at 29930222 (1968).
See, e.g., A. BONNICHON, LAW IN COMMUNIST
CHINA 24, 26-32 (1956); H. RIGNEY, FOUR YEARS IN
A

RED HELL 29 (1956). For an account of the Chinese

criminal process that is as detached as it is illuminating, by two Americans convicted of espionage after
several years of pre-trial detention, see A. RicKETT &
A. RIcKETT, PRISONERS OF LIBERATION (1957). For a

discussion of the experiences of various foreigners in
the PRC, see Cohen, The Personal Security of Businessmen and Trade Representatives, in LAW AND POLITICS
IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE 287-98 (V. Li ed., 1977).
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als, the PRC's frequent resort to extra-judicial
sanctioning processes administered by police,
military officials, Communist Party members
or the masses, provide much grist for antiCommunist propaganda mills. Contemporary
China's characteristic kangaroo court- the
"mass trial" before throngs of spectators-attained notoriety.
The advent of Sino-American d6tente in the
early 1970's led to the release of Downey, Fecteau and the few other American prisoners
remaining as vestiges of the era of bad feeling
and radically altered popular perception of
revolutionary China in the United States. Indeed, in the new era-one in which many
American visitors to China came home suffering from Marcopoloitis -interest in the costs of
Chairman Mao's society declined sharply while
attention focussed on the benefits it conferred.
It became almost a matter of poor taste to
point out the continuing existence in China of
severe criminal sanctions, and a vivid autobiographical account of seven years in PRC prison
and labor camps, 23 which might have been a
best-seller in the 1950's, went virtually unnoticed by the same Americans who were shocked
by Solzhenitzyn's GulagArchipelago.24 Although
visitors were occasionally permitted to view a
Chinese prison and, more rarely, a criminal
trial, I know of only one instance in over two
decades when a labor camp was included on a
visiting delegation's itinerary (the Chinese,
plainly sensitive to comparisons with the USSR,
insisted that it was not a "camp" but a "farm").'
Many returning travelers received the impression that "crime just isn't a problem in China
26

today.

Yet, precisely because of the enhanced contacts between the PRC and the rest of the
world that have flowed from d6tente, it is
important to strive for an accurate understanding of the state of criminal justice in contemporary China. For example, if cultural and
other exchanges expand beyond the present
modest levels, more and more Americans will
23

BAO

24 A.

Pasqualini) & R.
(1973).

RUO-WANG (I.

SKI, PRISONER OF MAO

SOLZHENITSYN,

THE

GULAG

CHELMIN-

ARCHIPELAGO,

1918-1956: AN EXPERIMENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION. (T. Whitney, trans 1974).
25 Interview with a member of an American lawyers' delegation that visited a labor camp in the

spring of 1977.
26
The quotation is from People's Justice: Judge
George W. Crockett, Jr., Looks at China's Legal System,

2 NEW CHINA 27. (No. 1, 1976).
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want to know about the risk of arbitrary imprisonment that they run by journeying to
China and residing there.27 If Sino-American
relations continue fo develop favorably, the
United States may iwish to negotiate a bilateral
consular agreement that would include some
provisions guaranteeing official access and assistance to Americaps who have run afoul of
the criminal process in China; this plainly will
require knowledge of the existing system and
the extent to which it currently provides such
opportunities.2s As debate waxes over whether
the United States should withdraw diplomatic
recognition from the ROC and confer it upon
the PRC, the extent to which the administration
ofjustice by the competing governments should
be characterized as tyrannical has become a
topic of discussion. 29 And if the United States
considers extending military assistance to the
PRC, both the Executive Branch and the Congress will have to assess the relevance of China's
criminal process in determining whether legislation prohibiting military aid to governments
that systematically repress their own nationals
applies to China. 0
The world community's belated acceptance
of China as a full participant has also increased
the importance of understanding its system for
administering criminal justice. Given the
Chinese system and the values underlying it, is
the PRC likely to adhere to existing multilateral
agreements prescribing minimum universal
standards for governments to observe regarding human rights? Will Peking's domestic standards be reflected in its attitude toward current
efforts to revise the Geneva Conventions for
the protection of prisoners of war and civilians
27 1, myself, was courteously questioned at some
length, but not detained, by Chinese border police
in August 1972, after informing customs officials
that I was re-entering the PRC with Chinese currency
obtained on a previous visit. See Cohen & Cohen, Up
Against the Great Wall, 27 HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 28,32
(1976).
2 For the PRC position regarding consular access
in the absence of agreement, see COHEN & CHIu,
note 12 supra, at 647-56. For examples of bilateral
consular agreements with the PRC, see id. at 105967.29See also the text accompanying note 206 infra.
See, e.g., Goldwater, A Travesty of Law, 61
A.B.AJ. 674 (1975), Commenting on R. Brown, Jr.,
Present-Day Law in the People's Republic of China, 61
A.B.A.J. 474-79, (1975).
30 For an excellent discussion of such legislation,
see Salzberg & Young, The ParliamentaryRole in Implementing International Human Rights: A U.S. Example,
12 TEx. INT. L.J. 251 (1977).

detained in wartime? To what extent will
China be acting hypocritically if it joins in
United Nations General Assembly denunciations of other governments for violations of
human rights relating to the criminal process?
The Chinese experience is relevant in many
contexts. Private international bodies such as
Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists eagerly seek more data
on PRC practice. As the Patricia Hearst case
illustrated, actors in the criminal process in
this country and elsewhere need to know more
about "thought reform" and its implications.
And scholars as well as diplomats and lawyers
will have to assimilate the experience of onequarter of humanity in order to determine
whether it is realistic to expect certain minimum standards of criminal justice to be accepted in practice as well as theory by all
nations regardless of history, culture, race,
religion, socioeconomic organization, ideology
and other factors.
This is a good time to take another look at
the criminal process in China. As part of the
increasing interest in the promotion of human
rights, there is ferment over similar problems
not only in the United States but also elsewhere
in the world. Moreover, now that the period of
d6tente-inspired euphoria is fading in this
country, it should become easier to adopt a
balanced view of the Chinese, one that is not
predisposed to categorize them as either saints
or sinners. It is time to do away with the double
standard toward the two major Communist
societies that many have applied in recent years
as they have castigated the Soviet Union for
injustices in its sanctioning processes while
averting a critical eye from the PRC. Perhaps
the following reflections will also help American scholars of criminal justice to overcome
their apparent reluctance to take account of
the Chinese experience even in studies that
purport to compare legal systems or to analyze
the relation between ideology and criminal procedure.
II
Almost ten years ago I published a 639-page
introduction to this subject, that dealt with the
years 1949-63. 31 Plainly it will not do to repeat
32
what has been printed there and elsewhere.
31

SeeJ. COHEN, note 21 supra.
32 Many studies relating to aspects of criminal
justice in the PRC have appeared. See e.g.,

SHAO-
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In the light of what we have been able to learn
during the past decade, however, I can discuss
some of the abiding and salient characteristics
of the Chinese criminal process as it has developed over the years 1949-77, a period twice as
long as that originally studied.
The first point to emphasize is that crime is
an important problem in China, no matter
what some wide-eyed travelers may report they
have been told. For example, any tourist who
uses his eyes can see that Chinese are careful
to lock their bicycles. It is not unusual for
ground-floor windows to have bars, and even
chests of drawers in model homes toured by
visitors tend to display padlocks. Chinese are
as human as the rest of humanity, live in
meager circumstances and are subject to inevitable temptations. Except for periods of upheaval such as the Cultural Revolution of 196669, foreigners generally need not worry about
theft or personal violence while in China, but
they must guard against extrapolating from
their own experience. The areas to which they
are admitted and the places where they are
accommodated are often not typical of the
society as a whole, and, as in the nineteenth
century, the commission of an offense against
a foreigner ordinarily brings with it especially
swift and heavy punishment because of the
33
embarrassment this causes the nation's honor.
COMMUNIST CHINA (1967);
V. Li, LAW WIGHOUT LAWYERS (1977); Li, The Role
of Law in Communist China, 1970 CHINA Q. 66 (No.
44); Lubman, Form and Function in the Chinese Criminal
Process, 69 COL. L. REV. 535 (1969); Pfeffer, Crime
and Punishment: China and the United States, in Cohen
(ed.), supra note 19, at 261; Tao, Politics and Law
Enforcement in China: 1949-1970, 22 Am. J. COMp. L.
713 (1974); W. Jones, A Possible Modelfor the Criminal
Trial in the People's Republic of China, 24 AM. J. Comp.
CHUAN LENG, JUSTICE IN
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It may well be that the PRC's vast improvement of social conditions during the past generation has brought about a corresponding
diminution of antisocial conduct but, because
the PRC issues no meaningful crime statistics,
we have to take such assertions on faith. Whatever the relative degree of progress in reducing
the crime rate, the Chinese media themselves
leave no doubt that crime persists in an absolute
and still important sense. The press continues
to issue warnings about the menace of counterrevolutionaries who commit sabotage and other

criminal acts, and no less an authority than
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, recently promoted
from the post of Minister of Public Security,
has acknowledged "new-born counterrevolutionaries" and bad elements "who are engaged
in beating, smashing and looting, steal state
property and endanger the peace and order of
society. ' '3 4 Provincial radio broadcasts call for
the suppression of "embezzlers, swindlers,
murderers, arsonists, criminal gangs and bad
elements. 3 5 And formerly discreet Chinese officials in Peking have recently begun to inform
foreign correspondents about bloody armed
conflict in several areas that has led to factories
being blown up, raids on military arsenals and
robberies of banks, grain stores and shops."6
PRC officials are fond of stating that only
approximately five percent of their populace
consists of "class enemies" who are basically
hostile to the government 7 and must be forced
to build socialism. It is difficult to be certain
what such statements mean. They do not seem
to refer to those who are merely politically
discontented. Given the continuing effort of
the Taiwan regime to stir up opposition, the
political, social and economic upheavals generated by the initial Communist seizure of power,

L. 229 (1976); Hungdah Chiu, The Judicial System
Under the New PRC Constitution, in THE NEW CONSTI-

34 Hua Kuo-feng, Speech at the Second National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, (Dec.

TUTION, OF COMMUNIST CHINA 63-121 (M. Lindsay
ed. 1976); Hungdah Chiu, The Judiciary in Post-Cultural Revolution China, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH

25, 1976), English translation in 20 PEKING REV. 31,
36 (No. 1, 1977).
3 Radio broadcast
entitled Chekiang Committee

SINO-AMERICAN

CONFERENCE

ON

MAINLAND

CHINA

99-121 (1976); Edwards, note 39 infra; Cohen, The
Chinese Communist Part), and 'Judicial Independence':1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1969) and the
other essays cited therein.
" See, e.g., Chinese Court Pronounces Death Sentence
on Counterrevolutionary Criminal, New China News
Agency-English, (Peking) June 13, 1966, reprinted in
U.S. Consulate, Hong Kong, SURVEY OF CHINA
MAINLAND PRESS, [S.C.M.P.] 1-3 (No. 3720, 1966) in
which the Supreme People's Court demonstrated a
determination to deter physical assaults upon foreign
diplomats and other aliens.

Holds Enlarged Meeting (Dec. 13, 1976). Printed in 1
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA G1-G2 (December 14, 1976); See

also, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1977 at 18.
'6 See, e.g., China Reported Stepping In to Halt Fighting in a City South of Peking, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30,
1976, at 1; Butterfield, China's Year of Disorder, N.Y.
Times,
Jan. 1, 1977, at 2.
3
1 See, e.g., BAo RUO-WANG & CHELMINSKI, supra
note 23, at 11; Whyte. Inequality and Stratificationin
China, 1975 CHINA Q. 684, 705 (No. 64). Saire,
Chinese Say Purgingof 'Gang of 4' Will Not Better Ties
with Soviets, N.Y. Times, March 25, 1977 at A9.
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disillusionment subsequently created by the
waves of mass movements and purges that
culminated in the near civil war of the Cultural
Revolution, the persisting "struggle between
the two lines" over power, policy and personalities, the personal hardships and restraints imposed by revolutionary discipline, and the inability of most dissidents to leave the country, it
surely would be remarkable if only five percent
were politically discontented. My own view is
that the five percent figure probably refers to
all those who are under some form of restraint,
supervision or surveillance by the public security system and the masses. Many of these are
people who, because of their own or their
parents' pre-1949 occupations, such as landlord, capitalist or ROC government official,
are considered suspect and deserving of special
attention even though they have committed no
overt anti-social act against the PRC. Nevertheless, although most members of the disfavored classes are too cowed and isolated to risk
violating the law, others from "the exploiter
class" continue to commit crimes.39 Moreover,
as Chairman Hua's reference to "new-born
counterrevolutionaries" implies, a large proportion of recently reported criminals are people from good class background and responsible positions whose serious anti-social behavior
leads to their being lumped with what the
authorities like to call the "handful of class
enemies. ' ' 40 Whether criminal or non-criminal,
five percent of more than 900 million people
yields forty-five million "class enemies," a population roughly equal to that of a west European country. This imposes an enormous burden on the public security system's resources.
In addition, the system must cope with a large
number of minor offenders whose conductperhaps hooliganism, petty theft, molesting
women or disseminating obscene thoughts-is

not so grave as to
warrant categorizing them as
41
"class enemies."1

The second point worth making is that, despite China's huge population, the resources
available to the criminal process are limited, in
personnel as well as finances. I recall interviewing a former police officer from Fukien province about whether his county public security
bureau had prosecuted persons suspected of
adultery. His response was: "If we had prosecuted all those who committed adultery, we
would have had no time to go after the counterrevolutionaries!" The relative scarcity of
trained officials is not a new problem ofjustice
in China. In view of the country's vast population and area, it has long been recognized that
an immense and cumbersome state apparatus
would be required to process all criminal cases
and to impose sanctions against all offenders.
Thus today, as in imperial China,42 the state's
burden is shared by consigning the handling
of many anti-social acts to persons other than
officials. This has the traditional virtue of conserving state resources and allowing local
groups to dispose of many of their own problems. It also comports with the PRC's ideological preference for the participation of the
masses in the new society and evidences some
progress in the long march toward the eventual
withering away of the state that Marxists claim
will mark the arrival of true communism.
Many minor acts that might otherwise be
deemed criminal are therefore considered and
disposed of "on the spot" by unofficial persons,
such as members of an agricultural production
team or a factory workshop, neighborhood
residents, or even ad hoc clusters of bystanders.
The "study" groups, in which most Chinese
participate, sometimes discuss and settle problems involving minor infractions by their members. Certain citizens are especially active in
informal sanctioning processes. Some have
been selected to serve on a part-time volunteer
basis to mediate disputes or to check on local
conditions, report suspicious behavior, and
otherwise cooperate with the police. Others,

8 See the discussion of class status in the text
accompanying notes 70 to 91, infra.
9See, e.g., cases 11 and 14 of the Notice of the
Intermediate People's Court of Tientsin (Aug. 5, 1973),
and case 2 of the Notice Issued by the Chinese People's
41 The case histories related by Professor Edwards
Liberation Army Military Control Committee of the Public
Security Organs of the Szu-Mao Region of Yunnan Prov- also demonstrate that, prior to the convictions reince, in Edwards, Reflections on Crime and Punishment ported; many of the accused had already had brushes
in China, (With Appended Sentencing Documents) with the law that had resulted in their receiving less
16 COL. J. TRANSNA'L. L. 45, 75, 82, 84, 97-98 (1977).
severe sanctions than those that had placed them in
40 See id.for other cases reported. As Professor
the42"class enemy" category.
See Cohen, ChineseMediation on the Eve of ModernEdwards notes, these demonstrate that a striking
number of serious offenders held responsible posi- ization, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1215-26 (1966) and
tions in PRC society until convicted as reported.
authorities cited therein.
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because of their responsibilities for production, education, neighborhood administration,
Communist Party or Youth League work or
other activities are naturally looked to for leadership in dealing with minor public order problems as well. Some of these persons may be
state employees, although not employed by the
public security apparatus. This is not to say
that the public security apparatus has nothing
to do with the handling of such cases. Practice
varies, of course, depending upon whether the
country is experiencing one of the anti-bureaucratic decentralizing campaigns that Chairman
Mao periodically favored or the alternating
periods in which strengthening organizational
discipline is emphasized. At least during the
latter periods, including Chairman Hua's present effort to strengthen the state security apparatus, the cop on the urban beat and the
policeman assigned to maintain contact be-

tween a rural commune and his county public
security bureau (or their superiors back at the
office) will usually be consulted if there is doubt
about the proper course of action. Often the
police divert to the appropriate group minor
cases already within their cognizance.
By classifying all such cases as "noncriminal," the PRC enables many offenders to
avoid severe stigmatization and reduces its national "crime" statistics. Nevertheless, the sanctions dispensed in these cases may amount to
considerably more than a private lecture on
Maoist ethics, an informal warning, or the
requirement that restitution, compensation or
an apology be made. The offender may have
to undergo the embarrassment of public criticism and self-criticism before a small or large
group of his peers and may have to write out
"statements of repentance" for posting in
prominent places. If his act is regarded more
seriously than most petty offenses, he may even
have to endure the mortification and fright of
a "struggle meeting," in which a large audience
subjects him to intense vilification. The prospect of "being struggled" has sometimes led
people to suicide.
Certain people are subject to special types of
"non-criminal" sanctions that are dispensed by
officials who are not responsible for public
security work but who coordinate their decision-making with the public security apparatus.
For example, the superiors of a government
employee who engages in antisocial behavior
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may, after consulting with the local public security bureau, impose a variety of "administrative punishments," such as the notation of a
demerit in his record, demotion or expulsion
from employment.43 Party members who commit misconduct are subject to a similar range
of Party-imposed sanctions .44 Although serious
misbehavior can lead the organization to impose severe "non-criminal" sanctions or recommend criminal prosecution as well as impose
loss of official or Party status, the latter in itself
is a very severe punishment, for it constitutes a
disgrace, a loss of privileged employment and
an assurance of downward mobility.
The police directly mete out many "noncriminal" sanctions. The Security Administration Punishment Act, 45 the nearest thing to a
criminal code yet promulgated in the PRC,
actually authorizes the public security force to
impose a formal warning, a modest fine and
up to fifteen days of detention upon those
whose misconduct disrupts public order46 and
yet "does not warrant criminal sanctions.

More disturbing is the unfettered power of
the police, and, during periods of anti-bureaucratic decentralization, of agricultural and factory units as well, to impose substantial sanctions of a continuing nature, such as "supervised labor." This stigmatizes an offender and
requires him to work under the supervision of
the masses either at his existing job or at a
special one, to absorb extra doses of indoctrination, and to restrict his activities and report
47
about them regularly.
The ultimate in "non-criminal" sanctions is
"rehabilitation through labor." This is confine43 Law of Oct. 26, 1957, Provisional Regulations of
the State Council of the PRC Relating to Rewards
and Punishments for Personnel of State Administrative Organs, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo fakuei hui-pien (Collection of Laws and Regulations of

the PRC) VI, 198-202. For the English translation,
seeJ. COHEN,SUpra note 21 at 193-195.
"See CONST. OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA,

ch. 2, art. IV (adopted Aug. 28, 1973). See also, 16
PEKING REV. 27 (No. 35, 36, 1973), for the reprinted
text.

15 Law of Oct. 22, 1957, Security Administration
Punishment Act of the PRC, 6 COLLECTION, supra
note 43, at 245-54, English translation (excerpt by
excerpt) in J. COHEN, supra note 21, at 205-37.
46 Articles 2, 3, seeJ. COHEN, supra note 21 at 205.
47 For discussion of "supervised labor" and its
relation to other sanctions, see J. COHEN, supra note
21 at 286-95.
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ment in a labor camp in physical conditions
that are often indistinguishable in substance
from those of the criminal punishment of "reform through labor." Although in stigma, loss
of status, loss of wages and certain other re48
spects the former is not as severe as the latter,
the term of confinement can be just as long.
The term was originally unspecified and is now
apparently limited to three years, at least in
principle, but it reportedly can be renewed.
The legislation that authorized "rehabilitation through labor" gives the impression of
providing a significant check upon the power
of the police to impose it, requiring the approval of the provincial level people's council
or its designee, 49 but in practice the public
security force has usually served as the designee, and the only restrictions against its arbitrary action derive from its own internal review
procedures. During some periods work units
have imposed this sanction as well as supervised
labor without having to clear these decisions
with the police.50 In view of the availability of
this sanction, which the authorizing legislation
concedes is "a measure of a coercive nature for
carrying out the education and reform of persons receiving it," 51 one can understand why
the PRC has not had to follow the post-Stalin
Soviet example by confining in mental institutions many of "[t]hose counterrevolutionaries
and anti-socialist reactionaries, who because
their crimes are minor, are not pursued for
52
criminal responsibility.
III
Among the many factors that determine
whether or not an offender will be "pursued
for criminal responsibility," timing is one of
the most crucial. The history of the People's
Republic has been highly dynamic, and its
progress has been dialectical. The Party line
for running the country has changed in alternating cycles of pressure and relaxation. Not
surprisingly, the criminal process, as one of
41

Compare the discussion in Whyte, CorrectiveLabor

Camps in China, 13 ASIAN SURVEY 253, 257-58, (1973)
with J. COHEN, supra note 21 at 249-74, 587-639.
49

Decision of the State Council of the PRC Relating to
Problems of Rehabilitation Through Labor, in 6 COLLECTION, supra note 43, at 243-44; English translation in
COHEN, supra note 21 at 249-50.
50
See Edwards, supra note 39 at 67, n. 77.
5152 Decision, supra note 49 at 249, art. 2.
Id., art. 1(2).

the regime's principal instruments for inducing
compliance by the populace, has reflected those
political changes.
Timing, that is, prevailing Party policy, is
important in several respects. It often determines whether given conduct will be treated as
antisocial. During the 1956-57 campaign to "Let
a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred
Schools of Thought Contend," nothing happened to those who accepted the invitation to
voice their criticisms of the regime. When the
anti-rightist movement began, however, many
of the critics were sent to rehabilitation through
labor or even convicted of crime and sent to
reform through labor, and no continuation of
the criticism was tolerated.
If certain conduct is to be suppressed, timing
frequently determines the type of sanction to
be used and therefore the type of process
considered appropriate. For example, in certain periods a peasant who has stolen a large
amount of grain from a collective granary has
been processed as a criminal; yet, during the
economic depression of 1960-62, which inflicted severe hardship upon the Chinese and
made such thefts a widespread problem, he
might only have received "criticism-education;"
but if caught during the subsequent "socialisteducation" movement, which sought to restore
discipline to the countryside while de-emphasizing resort to criminal sanctions, he might
have been given supervised labor.
Moreover, acts that are treated as crimes
regardless of the era are punished more
harshly in one period than another. Many who
were executed for corruption during the PRC's
earliest years would have been sentenced to
prison during the 1956-57 era when moderation was at its peak. And, during the "Strike
One-Oppose Three" campaign of 1970-71, the
death penalty, which in the two previous decades had only been applied sparingly in the
case of economic crimes, was reportedly employed widely in an effort to stamp out corruption, speculation and assorted blackmarket activities that proliferated due to the breakdown
of social and production discipline caused by
the Cultural Revolution.
The process itself, of course, has also been
affected by political change. During the preConstitutional period, in addition to a range of
"non-criminal" sanctioning processes, there
were really a variety of criminal processes: with
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a minimum of formality major sanctions were
dispensed by civilian courts, military courts,
the police, and land reform and other ad hoc
people's tribunals that were devised for the
mass movements that swept over the country.
The effort in the mid-1950's to import a unified, coherent legal system based on the Soviet
model led to judicial experiments with formal
public trials of a continental European type,
but the anti-rightist movement of 1957-58 put
an end to this. By the time that movement and
the Great Leap Forward of 1958-59 subsided, a
well-integated, police-dominated, administrative-type of criminal process was established.
It prevailed until the greatest upheaval of all,
the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, which went
beyond previous mass movements and attacked
not only the judiciary and the procuracy but
also the public security agency itself. This eventually required the People's Liberation Army
to restore order and to administer criminal
justice well into the 1970's until a system that
rather closely resembles the 1957-66 system
gradually replaced it. It is this system that is
the focus of our discussion, even though the
armed forces are still called upon to restore
order in areas where social discipline breaks
down.
Before proceeding with this discussion, however, because the PRC is likely to witness new
mass movements in the future-indeed, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng launched a major campaign in 1977 to purge Party and government
officials loyal to Chairman Mao's widow and
other members of "the gang of four" 53- we
should note the changes that tend to occur in
the criminal justice system during such a campaign. The central Party leadership in Peking
usually erects a special organization to direct
each nationwide movement, and the organization establishes at every level down to the
factory, commune, university, government
agency or other unit affected by the particular
movement an ad hoc group to coordinate its
operation. In a campaign to weed out counterrevolutionaries or rightists, for example, the
groups may be told, as they have been on
occasion, that roughly five percent of the members of each unit might fall within the category
designated as targets of the campaign. Each
group then proceeds to investigate potential
3 Butterfield, Hua Predicts Purge Across China in
'77, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1976, at 1; see Hua, supra
note 34, at 31.
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targets, interrogating people, studying personnel dossiers, preparing reports on each possible
target and discussing the reports. It then submits its findings and recommendations for
dealing with each selected target to the office
superior to it in the campaign's organizational
hierarchy. The superior office reviews the submission and decides whether to approve the
designation of the person in question as a
target and, if so, which sanction he should
receive, perhaps ordering that some people in
the unit be given supervised labor and some
rehabilitation through labor while formal
criminal proceedings be instituted against others. Upon receipt of the superior office's order,
the group usually will stage a series of "struggle
meetings" against each target, requiring him to
write out statements of "self-examination" before each session and making the statements
the focus of attack during the actual sessions.
Under the mounting pressure of these meetings, the target generally confesses at some
point, and the group then announces the label
or "cap" that is being placed upon him and
54
often, but not always, the sanction meted out.

If the sanction to be imposed is one that can be
carried out by the masses without the aid of
the police, such as supervised labor, criticism
and self-criticism or restitution of unlawfully
obtained property, the police may play no role
at all. 55 But if it is a matter of rehabilitation
through labor or reform through labor the
police are simply instructed by the campaign
organization to impose the approved sanction.
In any event the police generally do not initiate
their own inquiry before taking action as they
would do in cases unaffected by the campaign.
Because of their excesses, campaigns arouse
tensions not only between the authorities and
the people who are their potential and actual
targets, but also between the police and the
campaign organizations. What often happens
is that many campaign apparatchiks, eager to
-4

For an example of how the process works, see J.
supra note 21 at 261-64.

COHEN,

5 Stanley Lubman has pointed out that during the
"socialist education" campaigns from late 1962 until
1965 "police-administered sanctions in the countryside to a considerable degree gave way to direct mass
action-criticism and denunciation meetings-and
intraorganizational sanctions (i.e., punishments
within the communes) that were controlled primarily
by local Party officials." Only "the most extremely
bad elements" were dealt with "according to the
law," that is, by the criminal process. Lubman, supra
note 32, at 554-55.
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prove their zeal to the Party, act as though the
percentage suggested to them as a guide for
selecting targets is a quota imposed on them,
and they then proceed to overfulfill it regardless of the availability of appropriate targets.
When the movement subsides, its apparatus
disbands, leaving to the police the problem of
dealing with large numbers of persons whom
they do not believe should have been classified
as targets. Much to their distaste the police
then suffer the burden and embarrassment of
sorting out a messy situation and making
amends to those who should not have been
caught up in the net.
Chairman Mao was perfectly aware of this
situation. Indeed, he consciously endorsed excess as a tool for breaking the hold of tradition
and revolutionizing a conservative and backward society. As early as 1927, in his famous
Report on an Investigation of the Peasant
Movement in Hunan, 5s he argued that a reign
of terror was necessary for a period in order to
suppress counterrevolutionaries. "Proper limits
have to be exceeded in order to right a wrong
...." he concluded.5 7 There would be time to
make amends later. For example, toward the
close of the 1955-56 campaign to suppress
counterrevolutionaries, one of a series that had
swept over China, Mao, apparently concerned
that the killing had gotten out of hand, called
for fewer arrests and executions among the
ordinary people and for "killing none and
arresting few" among Party and government
officials, with exceptions to be sure. 58 Not long
56 Translated

in 1 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TsE23, 29 (1964).
Id.at 29.
'sMao Tse-tung, On the Ten Major Relationships,
(April 25, 1956); English translation in 20 PEKING
REV. 10, 20-21 (No. 1, 1977). Mao's speech is worth
quoting at length for the light it sheds upon this
point and others relating to the criminal process:
Third, from now on there should be fewer
arrests and executions in the suppression of
counter-revolutionaries in society at large. They
are the mortal and immediate enemies of the
people and are deeply hated by them, and
therefore a small number should be executed.
But most of them should be handed over to the
agricultural co-operatives and made to do farm
work under supervision and be reformed
through labour. All the same, we cannot announce that there will be no more executions,
and we must not abolish the death penalty.
Fourth, in clearing out counter-revolutionaries in Party and government organs, schools
and army units, we must adhere to the policy
started in Yenan of 'killing none and arresting
TUNG,
57

after, Mao proposed that the work of liquidating counterrevolution be completely examined
few.' Confirmed counter-revolutionaries are to
be screened by the organizations concerned,
and the public security bureaus are not to make
any arrest, the procuratorial organs are not to
start any legal proceedings and the law courts
are not to put anyone on trial. Well over 90 out
of every hundred counter-revolutionaries should
be dealt with in this way. This is what we mean
by 'arresting few.' As for executions, kill none.
What kind of people are those we don't execute? We don't execute people like Hu Feng,
Pan Han-nien, Jao Shu-Shih, or even captured
war criminals such as Emperor Pu Yi and Kang
Tse. We don't have them executed, not because
their crimes don't deserve capital punishment
but because such executions would yield no
advantage. If one such criminal is executed, a
second and a third will be compared with him
in their crimes and then many heads will begin
to roll. This is my first point. Second, people
may be wrongly executed. Once a head is
chopped off, history shows it can't be restored,
nor can it grow again as chives do, after being
cut. If you cut off a head by mistake, there is
no way to rectify the mistake, even if you want
to. The third point is that you will have destroyed a source of evidence. You need evidence
in order to suppress counter-revolutionaries.
Often one counter-revolutionary serves as a living witness against another, and there are cases
where you may want to consult him. If you
have got rid of him, you may not be able to get
evidence any more. And this will be to the
advantage of counter-revolution and not of revolution. The fourth point is that killing these
counter-revolutionaries won't (1) raise production, (2) raise the country's scientific level, (3)
help do away with the four pests, (4) strengthen
national defence, or (5) help recover Taiwan.
It will only earn you the reputation of killing
captives, and killing captives has always given
one a bad name. Another point is that counterrevolutionaries inside Party and government organs are different from those in society at large.
The latter lord it over the masses while the
former are somewhat removed from the masses,
and therefore make enemies in general but
seldom enemies in particular. What harm is
there in not killing any of them? Those who are
physically fit for manual labour should be reformed through labour, and those who are not
should be provided for. Counter-revolutionaries
are worthless, they are vermin, but once in your
hands, you can make them perform some kind
of service for the people.
But shall we enact a law stipulating that no
counter-revolutionary in Party and government
organs is to be executed? Ours is a policy for
internal observance, which need not be made
public, and all we need do is carry it out as far
as possible in practice. Supposing someone
should throw a bomb into this building, killing
everybody here, or half or one-third of the
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and that all discovered errors be "corrected."
As good Communists the police are undoubtedly familiar with Mao's view about the utility
of going too far, but their sense of vocation, of
pride in their professionalism even in a society
that has often been critical of expertise, nevertheless makes them resent the interference of
60
the mass movement.

IV

In the absence of a movement it is the police
who generally determine whether an offender
will be consigned to the formal criminal process. As we have seen, a large number of minor
offenses are handled "on the spot" by work
and residential units, and during periods of
decentralization some of these units have even
imposed severe "non-criminal" sanctions without checking with the police. But during periods of emphasis upon organizational discipline, such as the one introduced by the Hua
Kuo-feng government in 1977, they usually
consult representatives of the public security
apparatus if there is doubt about whether to
dispose of the case outside the formal process
or if a severe non-criminal sanction is thought
appropriate. Of course, like every other agency
in China the police are not divorced from Party
guidance and control. Although not every cop
people present, what would you say-to execute
or not to execute him? Certainly he must be
executed.
Adopting the policy of killing none when
eliminating counter-revolutionaries from Party
and government organs in no way prevents us
from being strict with them. Instead, it serves
as a safeguard against irretrievable mistakes,
and if mistakes are made, it gives us an opportunity to correct them. In this way many people
will be put at ease and distrust among comrades
inside the Party avoided. If counter-revolutionaries are not executed, they have to be fed. All
counter-revolutionaries should be given a way
out through earning a living, so that they can
start anew. This will be good for the cause of
the people and be well-received abroad.
Id. at 20-22.
59Mao Tse-tung, Problems Relating to the Correct
Handling of ContradictionsAmong the People (Feb. 27,

1957), in 5 COLLECTION, supra note 43, at 1; English
translation in COMMUNIST CHINA 1955-1959, POLICY
DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS 273-94 (1962); partial
translation inJ. COHEN, supra note 21, at 83-88.
60 One of the grounds on which the police were
criticized during the Cultural Revolution was that
they overemphasized the role of trained experts at
the expense of the masses. Lubman, supra note 32, at
573.
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on the beat or traffic policeman may be a Party
member, most members of the public security
force are. Party organizations exist within each
public security bureau and sub-bureau, and
the chief of the unit usually plays an important
role in the Party political-legal group that coordinates the handling of local public order
problems. This group in turn is part of the
broader Party apparatus that governs the area.
There is a considerable division of labor within
a public security bureau, with requirements
for internal review of the major decisions in
the criminal process. A neighborhood policeman cannot issue an arrest warrant, nor can an
investigator decide to initiate prosecution, without the approval of higher authority.
Whereas in the past the police, at least as a
matter of law if not always of practice, were
required to obtain the approval of the procurator's office prior to issuance of an arrest
warrant 6i or initiation of prosecution,62 the
abolition of the procurator's office-now formally acknowledged by the 1975 PRC Constitution 63 -relieves them of that obligation. The
procuratorial function, however, has been absorbed within the police institution .64 Although
this change puts an end to an external check
upon police activity, additional internal review
may be required as a safeguard against arbitrary police action.
Plainly the police exercise a vast amount of
discretion. To be sure, the PRC has made
efforts to limit that discretion. The 1954 and
61

CONST.

OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

OF CHINA,

art. 89 (1954), in 1 COLLECTION, supra note 43, at 431, had provided "No citizen may be arrested except
by decision of a people's court or with the sanction
of a people's procuracy." An English translation
can be found in Lindsay, ed., supra note 32, at 293,
310. The expectation was that the police would ordinarily seek approval from the procuracy rather than
the court.

62 See Law of Sept. 28, 1954, Law of the PRC for
the Organization of People's Procuracies, in COLLECTION, supra note 43, at 133, 136; English translation
in COHEN, supra note 21, at 406.
'

CONST.

OF

THE

PEOPLE's

REPUBLIC

OF

CHINA,

art. 25, 2 (1975), provides: "The functions and
powers of procuratorial organs are exercised by the
organs of public security at various levels." An English translation can be found in Lindsay, ed., supra
note
64 32, at 328, 335.
1Id. The successor provision to Article 89 of the
1954 Constitution now reads: "No citizen may be
arrested except by decision of a people's court or
with the sanction of a public security organ." CONST.
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, art. 28 (adopted
1975). Lindsay, supra note 32, at 336.
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1975 Constitutions and relevant legislation,
such as that authorizing the imposition of various "non-criminal" sanctions, 65 proscribing
certain conduct as criminal, 66 and prescribing
standards for detention, arrest and search of
suspects, 67 purported to provide some general
guidelines, although some were never observed
and others soon fell into disuse. Furthermore,
in the mid-'50's some scholars sought to articulate the factors to be taken into account in
determining whether in specific circumstances
a given act should be deemed a crime. They
urged law enforcement officials to consider the
social danger of the act, as manifested by its
nature, the harm actually inflicted, the actor's
intention and purpose, the circumstances of
the particular time and place, and other factors. 68 Yet in important respects, as a result of
the anti-rightist movement, their text became
obsolete even before publication in the fall of
1957.
Because the PRC does not make it possible
for foreign observers to catch more than a
glimpse of its legal system,

69

we cannot estimate

the extent to which its law enforcement officials
are responsive to articulated standards. As this
essay makes clear, there is considerable evidence that the police have often ignored such
standards and have acted arbitrarily. Nevertheless, their common training, ideology and work
experience, the existence of unpublished instructions that supplement published laws, the
See notes 45, 49 supra.
See note 21 supra; Law of April 21, 1952, Act of
the PRC for Punishment of Corruption, in COLLECTION, supra note 21, at 25-28; English translation in
J. COHEN, supra note 21, at 308-11.
67 See supra note 62; Law of Dec. 20, 1954, Arrest
and Detention Act of the PRC, in COLLECTION, supra
note 43, at 239-42; English translation in J. COHEN,
supra note 21, at 360-62, 386.
6Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo hsing-fa
tsung-tse chiang-yi, (Lectures on the General Principles of Criminal Law of the PRC) 56-59, 60-65, 67,
68 (Teaching and Research Office for Criminal Law
of the Central Political-Legal Cadres' School ed.
1957); English translation in J. COHEN, supra note 21,
at 328-34.
" See text accompanying note 25. In 1972 a visiting
Philippine delegation was told that "the legal organs
are not for sightseeing." See Cohen, Notes on Legal
Education in China, HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 18 (1973).
Since then, the PRC has returned to its pre-Cultural
Revolution policy of permitting occasional favored
groups to interview legal officials, view a trial, visit a
prison and, most recently, tour a labor camp. The
renewal of such brief opportunities, while welcome,
does not permit scholarly study of the legal system.

continuing flow of new internal directives to
meet evolving conditions and changing Party
policies and the functioning of hierarchical
review procedures under Party leadership are
factors that may produce a substantial degree
of consistency in handling similar cases at any
given time. Interviews with former police officials as well as those who were targets of the
system reinforce this impression, but, unfortunately, it can only remain an impression. It
should be noted that, although the police have
resented the intrusions into their bailiwick of
the non-professionals who preside over the
mass movements, they also frequently differed
with the procuracy and the courts over the
proper interpretation of constitutional and legislative prescriptions. This was especially true
during the mid-'50's, and these frictions were
eliminated or minimized through the subjugation of the latter agencies to police and Party
control, diminution of the scope of procuratorial and judicial activity, and eventual abolition
of the procuracy.
One of the most sensitive questions relating
to the administration of justice in the PRC is
whether a suspect's class status 70 is one of the
70 At the time of the land reform campaign,
launched shortly after the Communist takeover in
rural areas, families were grouped into class categories based on the economic position of the family
head. The principal classifications were landlords,
rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants and
hired peasants or other workers. During the PRC's
early years a similar, and even more complex, classification took place in the cities, again based on
occupation. There the principal categories were bureaucratic bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, petit
bourgeoisie, workers, and idlers and drifters, and
numerous sub-categories evolved. In addition to
these economically-derived labels, in both the countryside and the cities other categories and sub-categories were created in accordance with a person's
political and social records. "Counterrevolutionaries"
and "bad elements" were the two major disfavored
non-economic categories devised. In the generation
since the founding of the PRC there has been a good
deal of ferment in theory and practice regarding the
definition, relevance and implications of what is
compendiously referred to as "class status." Among
the many fascinating and difficult questions, apart
from those involved in appropriate application of
the labels, are: Which categories should be treated as
"the class enemy"? What consequences should attach
to that stigma? In what circumstances, if at all, is it
possible for individuals to shed their label and acquire
a more favorable one? Can children and grandchildren shed economically-derived labels? Politically-derived ones? For discussion of what is known on this

topic, see Whyte, Inequality and Stratificationin China,
1975 CHINA Q. 684, 698-711 (No. 64), and sources
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factors to be taken into account in determining
whether he should be charged with a crime.
Whatever the realities of practice, justice in the
West has increasingly demanded respect for
the principle of equality before the law; although too much remains to be done in coping
with inequalities deriving from factors such as
race, wealth, education and political views, considerable progress has been made toward realizing the principle. In China, by contrast, the
principle of equality before the law is derided
as a bourgeois sham, the observance of which
would only cripple the class struggle and the
dictatorship of the proletariat. The 1954 PRC
Constitution, following the Soviet model, had
provided that citizens "are equal before the
law,"' and legislation had spelled this out by
stating: "In the adjudication of cases by people's
courts, the law shall be applied uniformly to all
citizens irrespective of their nationality, race,
sex, occupation, social origin, religious belief,
level of education, property status, or duration
of residence.

' 72

Moreover, during the PRC's

early years, at times when the masses were not
being mobilized in one campaign or another,
commentators admonished law enforcement
cadres to overcome the "subjectivism" revealed
by their tendency to detain and convict suspects
largely because of their "bad" class background. 73 But the anti-rightist movement of
1957-58 witnessed the repudiation of the principle of equality before the law in both theory
and practice, 74 and no mention is made of it in
the 1975 Constitution.
cited therein. I am grateful to Frances Fung-wei Lai
for permission to read her unpublished paper, ContradictionsAmong Personal Status, Family Status and the
Concept of Class in the People's Republic of China (1976).

For an excellent discussion of the relation of an
individual's "family origin" and personal "political
rating" to his "class status" and his fate in the criminal
process, see Edwards, supra note 39, at 61-65.
1 Article 85, translated in Lindsay, supra note 32,
at 309.
72 Law of Sept. 28, 1954, Law for the Organization
of the People's Courts of the PRC, art. 5, in COLLECTION, supra note 43, at 123, 124.
73See Liu K'un-lin, Resolve to Oppose Subjectivism in
the Holding of Hearings, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao

(Yangtze Daily, Hankow),July 15, 1950, and I Kuang,
Overcome Subjectivist Ideology, Raise the Quality of Inves-

tigation of Cases, Kuang-ming Daily, (Peking) April
15, 1957. These are cited in Lubman, supra note 32,
at 544, 551, 565.
74

See e.g., Mao Jung-kuang, On Handling Cases
from the Viewpoint of Class Analysis, FA-HSOEH [Legal
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In his report explaining the new Constitution, Vice Premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (subsequently purged as one of "the gang of four")
emphasized that according to Marxism-Leninism: "The proletarian state is a machine for
the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat." 75 Implicitly he was drawing attention
to a fundamental theoretical difference between Peking and Moscow, one that has great
practical significance. It is the Chinese view
that class struggle and the dictatorship of the
proletariat must continue until the great day
when communism is attained and the state
withers away. The USSR, by contrast, adopted
the position in 1961 that in the Soviet Union
the class struggle and the dictatorship of the
proletariat had ended, even though the country
was still in the socialist stage en route to communism, and that the USSR had become "a
state of the whole people" that no longer discriminated against some of its people.7 6 This
position has been reaffirmed in the draft of
the new USSR Constitution released in the
spring of 1977.77
Following the Maoist line, Chang's report
went on to note that the dictatorship of the
proletariat means dictatorship over the enemy
and democratic centralism within the ranks of
the people.7 8 He thereby invoked Mao's famous
distinction between two kinds of contradictions:
Science] 9 (No. 7, 1958), and the discussion in

TAO-

TAI HSIA, GUIDE TO SELECTED LEGAL SOURCES OF

21 (1967), and see J. COHEN, supra
note 21, at 510.
7- Chang Chfin-chfao, Report on the Revision of the
Constitution, delivered January 13, 1975), in THE
MAINLAND CHINA

CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

47, 55 (1975).
70The 1961 Program of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union declared that "with the liquidation

of the exploiting class, the state's function of suppressing their resistance withers away." ROAD TO
COMMUNISM: DOCUMENTS

OF THE 22ND CONGRESS OF

17-31, 1961 at 546 (1971)
Khrushchev, in his report on the Program, stated:
"The transition from capitalism to socialism is efTHE CPSU,

OCTOBER

fected under conditions of class struggle ....
It is
natural .. . that the building of communism is effected by most democratic methods ....
Society will
no longer experience the difficulties induced by class
struggle within the country." Nikita Khrushchev, On
the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
in id. at 381; see Lai,supra note 70.
" See, The New Draft USSR Constitution, art. 1,
translated in 29 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PRESS 62 (No. 22, 1977).
7s See note 75 supra at 57.
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those "between the enemy and ourselves" and
those "within the people." 79 This basic dichotomy has been taught to every criminal justice
administrator, although there has been considerable debate over both how to determine
whether a suspect should fall in one category
or the other and what are the specific implications of the categorization." In some cases, of
course, it is easy to determine, without regard
to a suspect's class status, that a given act
reveals "a contradiction between the enemy
and ourselves" and deserves severe punishment. If, for example, an individual assassinated an important official while shouting
"Down with communism," there would be no
difficulty, whatever his class status, in convicting him of the crime of counterrevolution and
sentencing him to the death penalty. 81 But
many cases are not so simple. If a peasant is
caught stealing a few bowls of rice from a
commune granary, the authorities may be puzzled. Should he be treated as an enemy or a
member of the people, and with what consequence? Although, as we have seen, other
factors are also considered, in such cases the
suspect's class status often proves decisive. If
he is classified as a "poor peasant," he may
simply be released after some private criticismeducation or after criticism and self-criticism
before members of his production team. If he
has "landlord" or "rich peasant" status, however, he may be prosecuted and sentenced to
five years of reform through labor for the
counterrevolutionary crime of sabotaging socialist production. Because he is a member of
one of the "reactionary classes," evil intent can
be attributed to him even though he may actually have been motivated by hunger. Surely
there is at least a presumption to be overcome 82
These class labels were first attached at the
time of the Communist takeover a generation
ago. They do not connote any current economic status in an economy that has been
"9 See Mao Tse-tung, supra note 59.
80
See, e.g., Are All Crimes to Be Counted as Contradictions between the Enemy and Us? Are They All to Be
Regarded as Objects of Dictatorship? CHENG-FA YEN-CHIU

(Political-Legal Research) 73-76 (No. 3, 1958); partial
translation inj. COHEN, supra note 21, at 89-96.
81See also the example of the bomb-thrower cited
by Mao Tse-tung, supra note 58.
82 See the discussion in the sources cited in note 74
supra.

collectivized for two decades, and are often
inherited by children and even grandchildren. 3 Actually, the labels have not remained
constant. The constitutional definition of reactionary classes has expanded over the years.
The 1954 Constitution listed "feudal landlords"
and "bureaucrat capitalists" as the only politically disfavored classes, 84 but the 1975 Constitution, reflecting the intervening theory and
practice, refers to all landlords, adds the category of rich peasants, substitutes the broader
term "reactionary capitalists" for "bureaucrat
capitalists" and then adds, as a catchall, "other
bad elements."
The category of "bad elements" is not a class at all but a hotch-potch of
miscellaneous offenders. In his famous 1957
speech on "Problems Relating to the Correct
Handling of Contradictions Among the Peo'
ple"86
Mao made clear that "bad elements,"
like counterrevolutionaries, were to be lumped
with "the enemy" and treated as objects of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. He stated: "In
order to protect the social order and the interests of the vast [number of] people, it is also
necessary to put dictatorship into effect over
robbers, swindlers, murderer-arsonists, hooligan groups, and all kinds of bad elements who
seriously undermine social order. ' 87 Mao conceded that many people confused the two different types of contradictions, and he admitted
that "it is sometimes easy to confuse them" and
that "[i]n the work of liquidating counterrevolutionaries, good people were mistaken for
bad." He went on to say that "such things have
happened before and still happen today. We
have been able to keep our mistakes within
bounds because it has been our policy to prescribe that there must be a clear distinction
between the enemy and us and to prescribe
that mistakes should be rectified."8
The challenge of keeping mistakes within
bounds persists. This is why the Preamble to
the 1975 Constitution emphasized the importance of correctly distinguishing and handling
the two kinds of contradictions." And a 1976
8 See note 70 supra.
84 CONST.

OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA

art. 19 (1954); see Lindsay (ed.), supra note 32, at 297.
'

CONST.

OF THE

PEoPLE's

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

art. 14 (1975); see Lindsay (ed.), supra note 32, at 332.
8 See note 59 supra.
87 J. COHEN, supra note 21, at 85.
88 Id. at88.

19See Lindsay (ed.), supra note 32, at 329.
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radio broadcast from Kiangsu reported that all
courts in the province, while taking "class struggle as the key link" in dealing with "a handful
of class enemies engaged in sabotage," were
acting "firmly, unerringly and severely-with
emphasis on unerringly." 90 New China's leaders
seem well aware that they would risk endangering their society if they allowed unrestrained
use of the criminal law as an instrument of the
political warfare called "class struggle." Yet
they believe that it would be premature to
follow the Soviet example by announcing an
end to class struggle, especially in view of the
ongoing, ever more intense contest for power
in Peking and the purges that this periodically
generates at every level of government.
The difficulty of keeping mistakes within
bounds during the present "acute and complex
struggle between the two lines" is illustrated by
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's "important speech"
outlining the "fighting tasks for 1977," which
stated:
In the struggle to expose and criticize the 'gang
of four,' it is necessary to draw a strict distinction
between the two types of contradiction of differing nature and handle them correctly and carry
out Party policy in earnest. Our contradiction
with the 'gang of four' is one between ourselves
and the enemy. We must have a clear understanding of this. Those who followed the 'gang
of four' and made mistakes must be treated on
the merits of each case. Among them only a few
participated in the conspiracy, while the great
majority erred because they had come under the
influence of the gang ideologically. Even those
who participated in the conspiracy did so to a
greater or lesser extent. Whatever the extent,
they are welcome once they make a clean breast
of their part in the conspiracy and draw a clear
line between themselves and the 'gang of four.'
The target of attack should be confined to the
'gang of four' and the handful of their unrepen9
tant sworn followers. '

How lower ranking cadres are supposed to
apply this general instruction to concrete cases
is their problem. It is one with which I sympathize, however, for I recall that, during my
own brief career as a prosecutor, my superiors
frequently told me, in response to questions
about how to exercise discretion in the absence
90Kiangsu Court Holds Civil Affairs Conference, Feb.
10, 1976, printed in [United States] FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE [F.B.I.S.], 1 PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

G5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

F.B.I.S.].
" See Hua, supra note 34, at 38.

of specific guidelines: "You've got to play it by
ear."
Thus far, even though the Hua government
has been quick to reject certain policies of the
"gang of four," such as their views of foreign
trade, there is no evidence that it has repudiated the Maoist line calling for continuing
class struggle that was espoused by one of the
principal members of the gang, Chang Ch'unch'iao, in his report on the new Constitution.
V
Does the existence of broad police discretion
to initiate prosecution mean that an accused
can "plea bargain" in China? A Chinese law
enforcement official would have difficulty recognizing the concept. He might even be
shocked at the idea of officials allowing an
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense than
the evidence can sustain and thereby avoid
judicial examination of the case. Of course, the
criminal "trial" in China is in most cases merely
an in camera judicial scrutiny of the dossier
compiled by police investigation and interrogation, sometimes but not always supplemented
by a court official's questioning of the accused,
and perhaps witnesses, in private. This procedure is observed whether or not the accused
confesses and is otherwise cooperative. Thus
Chinese law enforcement officials do not have
as much incentive as American prosecutors do

to strike a bargain in order to save the state
and its citizens the considerable time, expense,
burden and uncertainty of a trial, especially
trial by jury.
Moreover, in China a criminal accused is in
an extremely weak position to bargain because
he lacks the procedural protections accorded
to his American counterpart. In all but minor
cases he is detained and cut off from any
outside contact while police interrogation and
investigation run their course. He sees no lawyer, no friends, no family, even if processing
of his case takes years. Usually he is given only
a subsistence diet that leaves him slightly hungry and on edge. He is frequently kept in a cell
with other prisoners who seek to improve their
own prospects by mobilizing group and other
pressures to urge him to make a full confession
and to reveal the involvement of others.92 And
92In recent years some ex-prisoners interviewed
in Hong Kong have indicated that cellmates were no
longer being mobilized to induce confession. See
Jones, supra note 32, at 230 n.4.
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he is subjected to interrogation, often for long
periods and late at night, by officials who have
been taught to use intimidation, ruses and
various psychological techniques to elicit his
cooperation. There is no presumption of his
innocence, the presumption, rather, is that he
would not have been detained unless he had
done something wrong, and it is up to him to
tell the police all about it instead of awaiting
specific accusations. Not only does he possess
no privilege against self-incrimination, but stubborn refusal to talk can even result in the
application of leg irons or handcuffs or a tour
in solitary confinement. Overt torture, however, is forbidden, although angry cellmates
have been known to assault the obdurate. The
fate of the accused is entirely in the hands of
his jailers. So far as foreign observers can tell,
there is currently no outside institutional restraint upon police detention, whether by
judges, legislators or others. 9 Nor can an accused rely on customary restraints upon the
state interrogation process, for the imperial
Chinese tradition attached great importance to
obtaining a confession and, in order to get it,
even authorized the use of judicial torture,
albeit within carefully prescribed, if not always
observed, limits.94
Thus the accused in the PRC confronts what
may well be the nearest thing to the Inquisition
in the contemporary world. In dealing with
those suspected of being "class enemies" the
dominant leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, like the Inquisition, views the criminal process as an official inquiry into an evil
that must be stamped out. In these circumstances it would be absurd, China's leaders
believe, to conduct that inquiry as a contest
between equals with the judiciary playing the
role of umpire to make certain that if the
prosecution violates the rules, it loses the game.
The state cannot be neutral in the struggle
against evil, they maintain; all of its agencies
must cooperate in, not interfere with, that
" The demise of the procuracy and the failure of
the National People's Congress and lower level legislative bodies to develop the possibilities for curbing
extended police detention eliminated two potential
restraints. Intervention by party officials has always
been possible but this has taken place on an ad hoc,
rather
than institutionalized, basis. See note 121 infra.
94
See Shuzo Shiga, Criminal ProcedureIn the Ch'ing
Dynasty 33 Toyo BUNKO 120-22 (1975); D. BODDE &
C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 97-98 (1967); J.
DOOLITTLE, 1 SOCIAL LIFE OF THE CHINESE 335-46

(1865).

struggle. If the "class enemies" were permitted
a host of procedural protections, they would
take advantage of them, refuse to reveal the
truth and thereby frustrate the investigation.
China has no belief that it is better to let many
guilty go free than to convict a single innocent
person. This is not to say that the Chinese are
indifferent to accuracy. They are not. Their
criminal law seeks to identify and punish offenders, isolate them from society when necessary, rehabilitate all those who are susceptible,
and deter and educate the populace. To the
extent that the guilty go free, these purposes
cannot be achieved. Nor can they be achieved
to the extent that the innocent are convicted.
The Chinese are aware that the coercive atmosphere of their inquisitorial process increases
the likelihood of eliciting not only true confessions but also false ones. But they believe that
through outside investigation and repeated
careful interrogation of the suspect, followed
by internal review within the police and verification by the judiciary, there is, on balance, a
higher probability of reaching accurate results
than if they employ a more adversarial, more
public process that offers the suspect greater
procedural safeguards. 95
Should this rationale for subjecting "the enemy" to an inquisitorial process also apply to
members of "the people" who are detained by
the police for criminal investigation? The system of dictatorship does not apply to "the
people," Chairman Mao maintained, and one
might therefore suppose that even in a criminal
case different procedures would apply in dealing with "a contradiction among the people"
than in dealing with "a contradiction between
the enemy and ourselves." Yet they do not.
One reason for this, of course, is that often the
proper classification can only be made after
the process has been completed. Moreover,
according to PRC ideology, there is no fundamental inconsistency between the interests of
the Chinese state and those of the people.
'5 This is not to say that arguments in favor of an
adversarial criminal process have not been voiced in
the PRC. During the 1956-57 era they plainly were
voiced, and with the Party leadership's approval. But
even that short-lived effort to introduce the benefits
to be derived from allowing "people's lawyers" to
defend accused was focussed on their role in public
trials before the courts rather than on assistance
rendered during pre-trial confinement. See Cohen,
Continuity and Change in China: Some 'Law Day'
Thoughts, 24 S. CAR. L. REV. 3, 12-13 (1972).
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Unlike the situation in bourgeois countries,
there is thus no need to protect a suspect by
means of rules that are based upon mistrust of
the state. A member of "the people" who is
detained for investigation should simply cooperate and tell all. He can be confident, the
Chinese Communists claim, that the state will
do the right thing, for it has his interests at
heart.
After all, if a parent returns home to find
that his children have destroyed the furniture,
he doesn't say: "Children, you are under suspicion, but you are under no obligation to tell
me anything about what happened, you have a
right to counsel before you make any statement, and anything you say may be used
against you." In this kind of situation parents
often privately interrogate their children, comparing the answers and demeanor of each with
those of the others and drawing appropriate
inferences if anyone refuses to answer. In family life, if parents want to know whether a child
has done something, they ask the child in
circumstances calculated to elicit a response.
Because parents have the best interests of the
child at heart and the child is supposed to
know this, our society generally accepts the
practice as a reasonable way to proceed. This is
the attitude that the People's Republic adopts
toward apparently wayward citizens.
The attitude is not a new one in China.
Traditionally the family was taken as the model
for relations between government and people,
and the county magistrate, the imperial official
closest to the people, was called thefu-mu kuan,
"the father and mother official." 96 Sir George
Staunton noted in 1810 that "[t]he vital and
universally operating principle of the Chinese
government is the duty of submission to parental authority, whether vested in the parents
themselves, or in their representatives .... 97
Nor is the attitude unique to China. As Harold
96 T'UNG-TSU CH'iD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA

14 (1962).
9'STAUNTON, supra note 7, at xviii. Staunton goes
on to note:
A government, constituted upon the basis of
parental authority, thus highly estimated and
extensively applied, has certainly the advantage
of being directly sanctioned by the immutable
and ever-operating laws of Nature, and must
thereby acquire a degree of firmness and durability to which governments, founded on the
fortuitous superiority of individuals, either in
strength or abilities, and continued only
UNDER THE CH'ING
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J. Berman has emphasized, Soviet law has a
strong parental flavor. 9s
Having said all this, I do not want to leave
the impression that in the Chinese criminal
process there are no similarities whatever to
plea bargining. In the settlement of disputes
involving what are generally regarded as minor
offenses, such as simple assault or petty theft,
the outcome often depends on the alleged
offender's attitude as demonstrated by his willingness to provide compensation, make restitution, apologize and express repentance. He
thus has some ability to manipulate the system
during his negotiations with local mediators or
police and the injured party in order to avoid
serious "non-criminal" sanctions and criminal
prosecution.
Similarly, if we consider the processing of
graver crimes, we find that, although the suspect cannot "cop a plea" to a lesser offense, he
does have an opportunity to influence his sentence through his preconviction behavior. To
most accused, after all, it is the length of the
sentence rather than the name of the crime
that counts, especially in the PRC, where there
are few limits upon sentencing discretion whatever the crime. For example, today in China,
as two millennia ago, someone who voluntarily
surrenders before the authorities either know
that a crime has been committed or identify
the suspect, or at least before they apprehend
him, is often dealt with less harshly than otherwise. 99 Further, a cardinal precept of the
Chinese criminal process, drummed incessantly
through the hereditary influence of particular
families, can never be expected to attain. Parental authority and prerogative seem to be, obviously, the most respectable of titles, and parental regard and affection the most amiable of
characters, with which sovereign or magisterial
power can be invested, and are those under
which, it is natural to suppose, it may most
easily be perpetuated.
Id. at xix.
98 H. BERMAN,

JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. (rev. ed.
1963). See id. at 282-84. Professor Berman points out

that K. Llewellyn, Lectures on Jurisprudence (mimeo-

graphed: 1948), "contrasts the 'adversary' with the
'parental' system, drawing for his definition of 'parental' on the law of the New Mexican Pueblo Indians, the medieval Inquisition, and the Soviet trials
of major political offenders." H. BERMAN, supra at
421.
See Rickett, Voluntary Surrender and Confession in
Chinese Law: The Problem of Continuity, 30 J. OF ASIAN
STUD. 797 (1971).
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into the ears of every detained person, is:
"Leniency for those who confess. Severity for
those who resist." This, like the relevance of a
suspect's class status, is an illustration of how
the PRC endorses, at the level of principle, a
practice long familiar in our own country despite our reluctance to recognize it in theory
and our efforts to curb its existence. The preference promised by the PRC-and often, but
not always, given-to a suspect who makes a
full and honest confession early in his interrogation rests in part upon the fact that this
conserves state resources both with respect to
interrogation and outside investigation. Prompt
confession and demonstrated repentance, in
addition to putting a feather in the cap of
interrogators, also usually represent the first
step toward rehabilitation, which the PRC emphasizes more than we do.
Because confession and repentance can result in a lighter sentence than otherwise, and
in some cases even in a decision not to prosecute, 100 in the coercive environment of the
detention house some innocent suspects become tempted to try this as a way out. Of
course, a suspect who stubbornly maintains his
innocence is often vindicated, but, if he is not,
he is likely to be treated as a recalcitrant and
given a stiff sentence, or he may simply languish in jail interminably pending further investigation. To avoid this risk and to put an
end to the psychological pressures of long detention and interrogation, some innocent suspects make false confessions' ° and these are
not always exposed by outside investigation,
repeated interrogation or judicial verification.
VI
If the Chinese criminal process is essentially
a secret, inquisitorial, administrative process,
how does this square with Peking's frequentlyvoiced endorsement of "the mass line" and the
educational and deterrent purposes of punishment? In its brief section on adjudication and
procuratorial organs the 1975 Constitution
100 Recall Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's recent speech
declaring that erring comrades who participated in
the conspiracy of the "gang of four" will be welcome
to remain in the Party "once they make a clean
breast of their part in the conspiracy before the
Party and the people." Text at note 91 supra.
101 For a vivid account of the circumstances that
elicit false confessions, see BAO RUE-WANG & CHELMINSKI, supra note 23, at 39-40, 46, 60-62.

omits any reference to the guaranties enshrined
in the 1954 Constitution. They had afforded
an accused the right to make a defense in what
was ordinarily to be a public trial °2 before a
tribunal that was composed of not only a judge
but also two representatives of the masses called
"people's assessors"103 and that was to be independent and subject only to the law. 1° 4 Apart
from the occasional trial of an alien or a trial to
which foreign visitors are are permitted, the
PRC has shown little interest in implementing
those guaranties since the "anti-rightist"' movement of 1957-58. The new Constitution provides instead that: "The mass line must be
applied in procuratorial work and trying cases.
In major counterrevolutionary criminal cases
the masses should be mobilized for discussion
and criticism."105 In practice what this has
meant is that in the course of their investigation
of a case the police, and sometimes judicial
workers, consult knowledgeable members of
the masses about the facts and often also gather
opinions about the seriousness of the case and
even the appropriate punishment. In one of
the rare criminal trials that foreigners have
been allowed to attend since the Cultural Revolution-a trial that seemed to adapt the experimental public trial model of the mid-'50s in
ways that allow more mass participation -the
court took pains not only to hear people in the
courtroom as witnesses but also to solicit their
10 0
views about proper disposition of the case.
Foreign visitors were recently told how a serious embezzlement case was handled-by police
investigation and then extensive discussions
among judicial workers, the masses and the
Party committee, which produced a consensus
10' 7
decision prior to "trial.
'
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Id. art. 75.
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art. 25 (1975) (in Lindsay (ed.), supra note 32, at 335).
0
"o
See Sanji, Observations of China's CriminalAdjudication, 47 H6RITSU JIH5 (The Law Times) 112, 11516 (July, 1975). I am grateful to Walter Ames, Ph.D.,
for allowing me to read his unpublished translation
of this article.
107 Garbus, Justice Without Courts, 60 JUDICATURE
395, 399-400 (1977). According to this account, delivered by a Shanghai judge, because this was a case
that would eventually result in a "mass trial," two
workers were appointed to serve as temporary cojudges (apparently people's assessors) together with
a career judge.
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Ever since 1949, Chinese Communist authorities, when imposing the death penalty, have
frequently claimed that they were doing so in
response to min-fen, "popular anger," an explicit recognition of the legitimacy of providing
an outlet for the spirit of vengeance aroused
by the most heinous crimes. In a recently
publicized 1956 speech Mao defended the mass
executions of 1951-52 on the ground that those
executed "were counterrevolutionaries who
owed the masses many blood debts and were
bitterly hated by them."'10 Of course, in interpreting the wishes of the masses the law enforcement authorities receive the guidance of
the Communist Party, "the vanguard of the
proletariat." In order to leave no doubt about
the desires of the masses and to give full play
to the deterrent and educational roles of the
criminal process, after a decision has been
made in a case that has educational significance, such as the embezzlement case mentioned above or a major counterrevolutionary
case, the Party often decides to announce the
sentence to a public meeting that may be attended by hundreds and occasionally thousands of people. At these so-called "mass trials"
representatives of the police and the judiciary
recite the crimes of the accused, who subsequently confesses to them with bowed head.
The authorities may then announce the sentence and ask the masses for their approval, or
they may first ask the masses what should be
done with the defendant and then pronounce
sentence. In either event, thanks to careful
planning and the efforts of Party activists in
the audience, who join officials on the stage in
fostering an atmosphere that has elements of
both a religious revival and a Roman amphitheater, consensus is preordained. This fulfills
the constitutional requirement that "in major
counterrevolutionary criminal cases the masses
should be mobilized for discussion and criticism," and it does not preclude other group
meetings or extensive resort to detailing the
facts of the case in wall posters in order to
maximize the deterrent and educational value
of the case. If, as sometimes happens in counterrevolutionary and even ordinary criminal
cases, the consensus favors the death penalty,
the accused is led to a nearby field and publicly
executed by shooting.
The death penalty leaves no possibility of
108
Mao Tse-tung, supra note 58, at 20.
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reforming the criminal. Not everyone can be
saved, the Chinese concede, even by the government that prides itself more than any other
on rehabilitation. PRC authorities are sensitive
about the large number of persons executed in
the early 1950s and the continuing resort to the
death penalty, because they claim to have
brought China more humane rule than their
predecessors.109 The leading criminal law text
produced by the PRC has stated somewhat
defensively:
If the death penalty were not applied, state law
and discipline could not be dignified, social justice could not be extended, and the anger of the
masses could not be pacified .... To use the

death penalty is not only necessary but also just.
One cannot confuse our country's death penalty
with that of the exploiter countries and discuss
them as if they were the same.110
In order to differentiate their death penalty
from that of the exploiters and to reduce the
frequency of its application, the Chinese Communists have developed a genuine innovation,
the suspended death sentence, which consists
of "sentencing to death, suspending execution
of sentence for two years, compelling labor,
and observing the consequences.""' If during
the two-year period of reform through labor
the condemned demonstrates sincere repentance and reform, his sentence is commuted to
life or long-term imprisonment; otherwise he
is executed. Although some visitors to China
have been told that the death sentence is always
meted out in the first instance in its suspended
form, both media reports and official Chinese
announcements leave no doubt that death sentences continue to be immediately carried out
against certain types of offenders. 2 The
newly-issued Volume V of Chairman Mao's
selected works, personally edited by Hua Kuofeng, pointedly includes a 1951 statement that
109
See Mao Tse-tung, supra note 58 and accompanying text. Note especially the excerpt from Chairman Mao's 1956 speech in the note.
"0 Lectures, supra note 68, at 201; English translation inJ. COHEN, supra note 21, at 535-36.
"I See Lectures, supra note 68, at 20; English translation inJ. COHEN,supra note 21, at 537.
'12
See Notice of the Intermediate People's Court of

Tientsin, (Aug. 5, 1973), translated in Edwards,
supra note 39, at 75-79, which lists four persons
sentenced to immediate execution for rape and one
for murder; China Executes 29 in Clampdown, LONDON
TIMEs, March 18, 1977 at 9.
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the suspended death penalty should never be
applied to those who owe "blood debts" or
have committed heinous crimes that have
aroused the demands of the masses for the
sternest punishment.'
Not surprisingly, the PRC reports that the
suspended death sentence has achieved very
good results and embodies "to a high degree
the spirit of revolutionary humanitarianism in
our country's criminal law and the state's policy
of 'uniting suppression with leniency.""' 4 Rejecting "imperialist" claims that it is cruel to
require convicts to live in uncertainty about life
or death for so long, in 1959 Lo Jui-ch'ing,
then Minister of Public Security (later sacked
in the Cultural Revolution), boasted:
In fact most of the criminals who are dealt with
in this way are spared. Where was there ever in
ancient or modern times, in China or abroad, so
great an innovation? Where could one find in
the capitalist world so humane a law?"'
Another aspect of the PRC's effort to implement a policy of "less killing" and to put the
best face on its use of the death penalty is its
adoption of special procedures for reviewing
capital cases. A 1957 law required that death
sentences be approved not only by the provincial-level high court but also by the Supreme
People's Court." 6 It is unclear, however,
whether this law is still operative. No one has
reconciled it with the continuing practice of
carrying out the death sentence immediately
113Mao Tse-tung, To Suppress Counterrevolution We
Must Carry Out the Party's Mass Line, (May, 1951) in 5
MAO TSE-TUNG HSFJAN-CHI (Selected Works of Mao

Tse-tung) 39, 40 (1977). This statement has been
invoked during the current purge of provincial political opponents by the Director of the Political-Legal
Work Leadership Group of the Kiangsi Provincial
Party Committee to support his call for killing the
ringleaders among counterrevolutionaries. See Richard Lee, Hua Presses on With the ,Purge, 97 FAR
EASTERN ECON. REV. 23 (1977).
114See note 111 supra.
"' Lo Jui-ch'ing, The Struggle of the Revolution
Against Counterrevolutionin the PastTen Years, People's
Daily, Sept. 28, 1959, at 3; English translation in J.
COHEN,
supra note 2 1, at 539.
6
11
See Reply of the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress of the PRC to the Supreme People's
CourtRelating to Problems of How to Execute the Resolution That Death Penalty Cases Shall Be Decided by Judgment of or Approved by the Supreme People's Court,
(Sept. 26, 1957), in 6 COLLUCTION, supra note 43, at
297; English translation in J. COHEN, supra note 21,
at 541-42.

after its announcement at a "mass trial," although it is conceivable that in such cases the
lower court obtains Supreme Court approval
prior to the public pronouncement of sentence.
Yet a 1973 notice of the Tientsin Intermediate
Level Court announcing the immediate execution of five offenders whose crimes had made
the people "extremely indignant"stated only
that the sentences, like others of lesser severity,
had been ratified by the revolutionary committee that governs the city." 7 Moreover, since
the Cultural Revolution the general role of the
Supreme Court has become murkier than ever.
In 1975, for example, two law professors at
Peking University told an incredulous visiting
judge from the United States that they didn't
even know how many judges served on the
current Supreme Court,118 and in 1977 a Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court told a
group of American lawyers that his court only
decides serious cases of national significance
but had heard no such cases in recent years;
nothing was said about reviewing capital cases.119
In theory, of course, one appeal-to the
court immediately above the sentencing court is available to all convicted persons. All those
sentenced by the Tientsin Intermediate Level
Court, for example, have a right to appeal to
the High Court of the province. In the mid1950s appeals were relatively few but they appeared to be surprisingly effective for those
courageous enough to try their luck.iss Since
then, however, the realities of life seem to have
further diminished resort to appeal, although
we have little information on this topic. The
demise of "people's lawyers" in the late 1950's
deprived defendants of any opportunity for
assistance in preparing an appeal on legal
grounds, and the defendant, who has usually
confessed and who remains in confinement, is
ill-equipped to seek review of the facts as well.
More fundamentally, the very concept of
appeal is antithetical to the thinking of many
who administer the Chinese system. An appeal,
after all, is an open challenge to the officials in
charge that may embarrass them and lead to
repudiation of their decision. Further, like a
request for a lawyer, it shows that the defend117See

Edwards, supra note 39, at 93.

128Interview with the Honorable Stanley Weigel,

United States District Court, San Francisco.
119Interview with a member of the group.
120SeeJ. CoHEN,supra note 21, at38, n.111.
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ant is not sincerely reflecting on his misdeeds,
repenting and seeking to reform himself, but
is still recalcitrant, mistrustful and attempting
to evade responsibility. Such a defendant risks
informal retaliation by cellmates annoyed at
their failure to "straighten out his thinking" as
well as by detention authorities.
Finally, Chinese appellate courts are free to
increase as well as decrease the original sentence even when it is the defense rather than
the government that appeals. In these circumstances the accused may understandably decide
against appeal and hope that the public security
force, the courts or other agencies will eventually review his case during one of the surveys
they occasionally make, that through letterwriting or personal interviews family or friends
may interest some influential Party or government officials in stimulating a review121 or that
by exemplary behavior at labor camp he may
become one of the relatively rare persons who
earns a reduced sentence or conditional
release. Perhaps the decision to forego appeal
is made somewhat easier for those knowledgeable persons who are aware of the fact that the
PRC places a low value on the finality of decision-making and in the interest of accuracy
permits attack upon a criminal judgment for a
substantial reason at any time after the opportunity for appeal has expired.
VII
As I have already indicated, the sentencing
discretion of Chinese courts, like police discretion to initiate prosecution, is very broad. The
few published criminal statutes, in addition to
indicating the elements of novel crimes such as

counterrevolution

the many charges lodged against the
"gang of four" is the accusation that, at least in
Kweichow Province, they threatened
the provincial and prefectural Communist Party
committees, wanting them to release those on
the lists of criminals who had been in the custody
of the public security bureaus and sentenced by
the judicial organs of various counties, in order
to make these criminals their backbone elements
for opposing the party and seizing power.
Bonavia, China: The Heat's on in the Provinces, 97 FAR
EASTERN EcON. REV. 24-25 (1977). In 1957 the then

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Tung Pi-wu,
reported that more than half the court's workload
that year involved informal special petitions rather
than regular appeals or statutory reviews. Report on
the Work of the Supreme People'sCourt, in 6 COLLECTION,
supra note 43, at 272-73.

and

the

criteria for determining appropriate sentences

in different circumstances. Nevertheless, they
do little to limit decision-making. As in the
case of common crimes, such as murder, rape
and arson, which have yet to be dealt with in
published PRC legislation, unpublished regulations and previous practice provide a certain
amount of guidance.122 In considering the recommendation of the police for handling the
case, the court takes into account the same
factors as the police, including the offender's
class status and political record. 123 Judges are

generally Party members, each court has a
Party unit within it, and the presiding judge is
usually a member of the Party political-legal
group that coordinates the handling of local
public order problems and that, under the
direction of the Party committee for the area,
provides guidance in cases of any importance
or difficulty.
More unusual to us than the sentencing discretion of the judiciary, or that exercised jointly
by the public security organ and the sentencing
court when considering reduction of sentence
or conditional release of a convict for good
behavior, is the discretion that the public security and court jointly enjoy to extend sentences.
They may do so in the cases of those who "do

not labor actively but repeatedly violate prison
rules, and the facts prove that they still have
not reformed and that there is a real possibility
that they will continue to endanger the security
of society after release ...."124
Although only
a relatively small number of prisoners have
their sentences extended, most are aware that
12

121 Among

and corruption

range of applicable sanctions, also offer some

Chairman Mao's recently revealed 1956 speech,

already extensively quoted, see note 58 supra, illustrates one kind of secret policy instruction communicated to law enforcement officials. It was plainly
designed to circumscribe their discretion and does
provide some additional, up to date guidance as well
as interesting justification of the new policy. Yet, as

Mao implies, officials retain the flexibility to act
according to the circumstances of each case because,
as he says, "Ours isa policy for internal observance
which need not be made public, and allwe need do
iscarry itout as far as possible in practice."
12' See Edwards, supra note 39, at 54-74. Edwards
presents an excellent analysis of PRC sentencing

theory and practice.
124 Law of Sept. 7, 1954, Act of the PRC for
Reform Through Labor, art. 72 inCOLLECTION, supra
note 21, at 33-42; English translation in J. COHEN,
supra note 21, at 619.
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such action, which is often taken without giving
the convict notice or an opportunity to be
heard, is a possibility.
Even more distinctive and disturbing is the
practice of "retaining" convicts whose sentences
have expired and "employing" them as civilian
members of reform through labor groups or
resettling them as ordinary peasants in newlyestablished villages near the labor camp. Some
prisoners genuinely volunteer to stay on at
labor camp after expiration of their sentence,
because they have neither family nor job awaiting them at home, worry about getting into
trouble or fear a hostile reception or other
difficulties of readjustment in their original
community. Some who have special skills that
are needed by the camp may be pressured
through "persuasion-education" into agreeing
to stay on. But if convicts have no family and
job awaiting them orIf they are needed to help
settle sparsely inhabited areas, their reform
through labor unit is authorized, after obtaining the approval of the competent public security organ (usually the unit that recommended
prosecution), to retain them and find employment for them without their consent.125 No

judicial approval is required as it is for modification of sentence, apparently on the theory
that such action relates to employment rather
than criminal sanctions. Although they may
continue to work with prisoners, retained persons live apart, receive regular wages, are relatively unrestricted in nonworking hours and
may obtain government assistance to enable
their families to resettle with them. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to regard involuntary
retention in what is usually a remote place as a
significant sanction, one that makes a prison
sentence even more unattractive than commonly realized.
Bao Ruo-wang, who was confined in a series
of Chinese prisons and labor camps from 1957
to 1964, has written:
There is a simple, basic truth about the labor
camps that seems to be unknown in the West:
For all but a handful of exceptional cases ...
the prison experience is total and permanent.
The men and women sentenced to reform
through labor spend the remainder of their lives
in the camps, as prisoners first and then as "free
workers" after their terms have expired.
Labor camps in China are a lifetime contract.
125
Id.,

art. 62 at 40; translated inJ.

COHEN at 634.

econThey are far too important to the national
126
omy to be run with transient personnel.
Until the PRC chooses to provide us with statistics, we shall not know whether Bao is right in
suggesting that only a handful of prisoners
ever return from labor camp. While confirming
that prisoners who refuse to reform can have
their sentences extended, Chinese reform
through labor authorities recently told a visiting
group of Americans that, once sentences have
been served, the offenders are released and
returned to their home communities, where
they are given jobs and placed under surveillance. 2 7 A Chinese emigr6 who from 1969 to
1972 served as an official in work relating to
the criminal process in Fukien province has
reported that, following a cryptic 1969 statement by Chairman Mao, many labor camps in
Fukien were closed and their inmates dispersed
for "supervised reform" in factories, communes and residential units.12 8 In these circumstances it is unclear whether large numbers of
released offenders stay on in labor camps. We
should bear in mind the possibility that they do
stay on when considering Chinese claims of
success in transforming offenders into new
persons. To the extent that released offenders
do not return to their old haunts, then the
graduates of thought reform do not confront
the same test that released criminals do in
countries admittedly troubled by recidivism.
From time to time PRC propaganda focuses
on the unconditional return to society of certain
supposedly reformed offenders, such as former Kuomintang generals released after
29
twenty-five years in prison as war criminals.
We also know that some foreigners have had
their thinking genuinely transformed after
years in Chinese prison. 130 Yet other foreigners
have not, and many Chinese have only paid lip
service to the reform efforts of prison authorities and are quite cynical about them. 3 1 Without Peking's cooperation, any studies of the
126 BAO RUO-WANG,

supra note 23, at 11.

Interview with a member of a lawyer's delegation that visited China in May 1977.
128 See Edwards,supra note 39, at 50 n.12, 55.
129 See, e.g., NPC Standing Committee's Decision
Granting Special Amnesty To and Releasing All War
Criminals in Custody, 18 PEKING REv. 11 (No. 12, 1975).
"0See, e.g., A. RicETT & A. RIcrrTT, PRISONERS
127

OF LIBERATION (2nd ed. 1973).
131See BAO Ruo-WANG & CHELMINSKI, supra

23, at 305-08; Whyte, supra note 48, at 264-66.

note
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subject must necessarily be based on fragmentary sources. One of the few studies thus far
published suggests that thought reform may
achieve better results with offenders while they
are awaiting their sentences than while they
subsequently are serving their sentences.' 32
Whether the pre-sentence ideological transformation is genuine or merely displayed to elicit
a favorable sentence is uncertain. Presumably
those given a suspended death sentence are in
a position more anal6gous to the unsentenced
than to the sentenced.
In evaluating the PRC's success in reforming
offenders, we should not overlook the enormous effort expended to alter the behavior
and thinking of those whose misconduct was
not serious enough to result in a term of reform
through labor or the "non-criminal" rehabilitation through labor. The application of sanctions ranging from private criticism to supervised labor, while the offenders remain functioning members of society, may be far more
effective than the measures applied to those
who are confined.
Before concluding, we should note one further change made in the 1975 Constitution that
relates to the criminal process. Article 97 of the
previous Constitution had provided:
Citizens of the People's Republic of China have
the right to bring complaints against any person
working in organs of state for transgression of
law or neglect of duty by making a written or
verbal statement to any organ of state at any
level. People suffering loss by reason of infringement of their rights as citizens by persons working in organs of state have the right to compensation.ln
Under that provision someone who suffered
false arrest or wrongful conviction had the
right not only to file a complaint against the
responsible law enforcement officials but also
to be compensated for the monetary damage
suffered, such as wages lost during the period
of unlawful detention or the cost of necessary
medical care. Indeed, some persons were compensated in cases of this nature prior to the
1954 Constitution; after its promulgation, although no such cases are known to have been
reported, and no statute established procedures for handling complaints, the national

34
budget did set aside funds for compensation.1
Moreover, interviews suggest that, although
most persons who believed that they had suffered false arrest or wrongful conviction were
too ignorant, fearful or skeptical to file complaints and apply for compensation, in some
cases of the most severe hardship the state
granted on its own initiative what was13 euphe-

mistically termed a "living allowance.'

retaliation. 13 7 It is unclear whether the desire

to curb the reemergence of bureaucratism was
a more powerful motivation of the sponsors of
this provision than any intrinsic concern for
assuaging grievances and vindicating rights.
Similar multiple motivations have inspired the
periodic rectification campaigns that seek to
improve government operations and offer additional opportunities to complain about ill
treatment at the hands of law enforcement
officials. The cause of human rights, of course,
was not promoted by elimination of the compensation provision of the previous Constitution. That provision, however, probably offended those Party leaders who believe that
the award of monetary compensation by the
34

1 See Fukushima, Chinese Legal Affairs (Second Dis-

cussion), in

CHOGOKU NO HO TO SHAKAI (Chinese Law
and Society) 47 (1960), English translation in J.
COHEN, supra note 21, at 583.
3 See J. COHEN, supra note 21, at 41-42.
136 CONSTITUTION
CHINA,

'

Whyte, supra note 48, at 265.
See Lindsay (ed.), supra note 32, at 311.

OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF

art. 27 (1975) in Lindsay (ed.), supra note 32,

at 336.
137

See also THE

'a'

'

In light of this background it is significant
that the 1975 Constitution, while retaining almost verbatim the first sentence of old Article
97 guaranteeing the right to complain, eliminated the entire second sentence authorizing
compensation for infringement of that right.
Instead it substituted a new sentence providing
that: "No one may attempt to hinder or obstruct the making of such complaints or retaliate against those who make them."'13 The
addition of this provision is welcome because
practice under the 1954 Constitution had demonstrated that, if a detained citizen was sufficiently educated to know of his right to complain about being held unlawfully, he was also
likely to know that those who sought to exercise
that right frequently were not allowed to do so
or were deemed recalcitrant and deserving of

HUNDRED FLOWERS CAMPAIGN AND

THE CHINESE INTELLECTUALS

ed. 1960).

229 (R. MacFarquhar
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state smacks of bourgeois society and encourages individual selfishness.
VIII
Some useful perspective on criminal justice
in the PRC can be gained by briefly considering
the situation in the Republic of China (ROC)
on Taiwan. Superficially the contrast seems to
be very great. "Free China," a type of capitalist
regime that is increasingly tied to the market
economies of the world and has made remarkable economic and social advances in recent
years, maintains published European-style
codes of criminal law and procedure and a
legal profession, under the impressive Constitution of 1946 that melds Chinese and Western
democratic institutions and concepts.138 For almost thirty years, however, because of the
continuing civil war with the Communists, martial law has suspended the implementation of
key provisions of the Constitution, including
those relating to criminal justice. In practice
what is in fact an authoritarian dictatorship by
the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) has,
through the use of military tribunals, Party
controls and other techniques, considerably restricted the formal, civilian legal system de1 39
scribed in the codes.
Although the subject has yet to be studied it is too politically sensitive for Chinese scholars
and has been ignored by foreign observers there are certain striking similarities between
the ROC and the PRC with respect to dispensation of severe sanctions. A provincial level
committee composed of representatives of the
Garrison Command of the Chinese Nationalist
army, the Bureau of Investigation of the Ministry of Justice, the Military Police Headquarters, and the Taiwan Provincial Police, on the
138 For English translations of the Constitution of
the Republic of China and the codes of criminal law
and procedure as of 1961, see THE LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 3-41, 893-996, 1085-1208 (1st
Series, 1961). For up-to-date versions of these laws in
Chinese, see TsuI-HsiN LU-FA cH'UAN-sHu (Complete Collection of the Six Codes) 1-7, 307-24, 35982 (Lin Chi-tung ed., 1977). For an English translation of the code of criminal procedure as revised in
1966, see 2 A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 333-460 (1967).

M See Ming-min Peng, PoliticalOffences in Taiwan:
Laws and Problems, 1971 CHINA Q. 471 (No. 47), for a

detailed discussion of the consequences of the "state
of siege" proclaimed throughout the island on May
19, 1949.

recommendation of the similarly-constituted
county or city committee, is empowered to
send "hooligans" to renewable three-year terms
in labor camps that have stricter discipline than
regular prisons.4' "Hooligans" are sweepingly

and vaguely defined to include not only those
who organize secret societies or extort, harass,
oppress and cheat others, but also those who
aid and abet litigation, or fail to give themselves
up to the authorities and reform themselves
after committing acts injurious to public order,
or are vagrants and lazy-bones and habitual
violators of police regulations.1 4 1 Because this

sanction of "reformatory education," like the
PRC's "rehabilitation through labor," is said to
be "non-criminal," no court approval is required for its imposition; nor apparently is any
notice or hearing required prior to the decision, although an administrative appeal has
been available since 1965.
Professor Ming-min Peng has claimed that
this sanction and the procedure for applying it
are applicable, under the Measure for the Reform of Rebels During the Period of Communist Rebellion,14

2

to political dissidents who may

be suspected of violating any of a host of vague
and repressive laws that prohibit strikes, demonstrations, unapproved petitions and public
meetings, rumor-mongering, and other "subversive activities. 1 4 3 On its face, however, Ar-

ticle 2 (1) of this Measure requires reformatory
education of rebels to be ordered by a military
tribunal rather than the provincial committee
that decides upon the reform of hooligans.
Whichever is the authorized agency, Professor
Peng maintains that:
As a matter of practice, the order for internment
is given when the Government, while having
140 See written statement of the Taiwan Provincial
Police Department and verbal statement of Commissioner Chou Chung-feng in 15 T'AI-WAN-SHENG IHUI KUNG-PAO (Official Gazette of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly) 261, 263 (No. 9, 1966).

141See The Regulationfor the Control of Hooligans in
the Province of Taiwan Under Martial Law, in 56 Ssu-

(The Judicial Special Gazette) 229495 (1955).
142 Issued by the Executive Yuan May 4, 1957 and
amended December 3, 1957 and January 16, 1959, in
2 CHUNG-HUA MIN-KUO HSIEN-HSING FA-KUEI HUIPIEN (Collection of current laws and ordinances of
the Republic of China) 2038-39 (1970).
143See Ming-min Peng, supra note 139, at 472, 476,
491-93.
FA CHUAN-'AN
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suspicions concerning a person's thought or behaviour, is unable to find sufficient basis for
formal prosecution and conviction, and simply
decides to "reform" the person's thoughts.'"
Where sufficient evidence of "subversive activities" does exist, the authorities will bring a
criminal prosecution against a political dissident, as they did against Professor Peng himself
in 1964 when, while an expert on international
law at National Taiwan University's Faculty of
Law, he and two associates were arrested as
they prepared to distribute handbills advocat45
In these
ing the independence of Taiwan.
by the
be
tried
circumstances the case need not
civilian courts but by the military courts, which
employ more summary procedures than the
civilian courts and dispense much harsher punishments, including the death penalty for many
offenses. In such cases, as on the mainland,
the accused faces a classic inquisitorial situation.
He enjoys no privilege against self-incrimination or presumption of innocence, can be held
incommunicado for a long period in a coercive
environment that may feature "third-degree"
interrogation methods, and finds that full revelation is the only way to end the ordeal.
Confessions and all other statements by the
suspect are carefully checked through outside
investigation. Although a trial before the military tribunal contains more formal elements
than are usual in criminal adjudications on the
mainland, it is nevertheless psychologically intimidating. The role of defense counsel is limited; trials are generally secret; and the judges
are under the political control of both their
military superiors and the security police. Professor Peng goes so far as to claim that: "As a
matter of fact, before its delivery, the court's
decision on a political case must be 'approved'
by the security organ which arrested and investigated the defendants and which reserves the
right to ask the court to alter its planned
sentence, usually to the defendant's disadvan46
tage.' Conviction is followed by long confinement in either prison or labor camp, where
intensive doses of thought reform are administered by techniques that include group studynot of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, but of the
ideas of Confucius, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang
44

Id. at 480.
"I' The events are vividly, yet coolly, described in
MING-MIN PENG, A TASTE OF FREEDOM 135-75 (1972).
'46 Ming-min Peng, supra note 139, at 487.
1

Kai-shek. Those accused of political offenses
can remain confined indefinitely, even after
they are eligible for release and even if found
not guilty, unless satisfactory persons on the
outside are willing to guarantee their future
behavior and thoughts.

47

Those who are re-

leased are expected to make public their repentance and express their thanks for the magnanimity of the regime, as is the case in the
PRC as well.
Despite the fact that the Kuomintang also
controls the civilian courts, in times of tension
not only political offenses but also certain common crimes are prosecuted before the military
courts in order to assure swift and harsh retribution as effective deterrence. In early 1976,
for example, a number of civilians charged
with robbery, including a purse snatcher who
was a first offender, were brought before military courts, quickly convicted, sentenced to
4

death and executed.1

8

There are also similarities between the ROC
and the PRC in the dispensation of some minor
sanctions. The Security Administration Punish149
on the mainland is modelled upon
ment Act

the ROC's Law for the Punishment of Police
Offenses, 50 which went into effect long before
Chiang Kai-shek's government fled to Taiwan.
And the PRC legislation that authorizes popular mediation committees to settle disputes including minor criminal cases'-" is a descendant
of the Republican mediation statute of 1930 that,
152
as amended, is still in operation in Taiwan.
Republican society, however, is not as tightly
organized as mainland society, and the ROC
does not call upon its constituent social groups
to play as important a role in the informal
sanctioning process as mainland social units do.
47

'

Id. at 488.

148See Chung Yang Jih Pao (Central Daily News),

Jan. 22, 1976, at 3; Jan. 25, 1976, at 3. See also China
News (Taipei), Jan. 23, 1976, at 2.
149See note 45 supra.

150For an English translation of this law as of
1960, see

THE LAW FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF POLICE

OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (L. Fuller &
H. Fisher, Jr., trans. 1960). For an up-to-date
Chinese version, see Lin Chi-tung (ed.), supra note
138, at 456-61.
I-"See Law of March 22, 1954, Provisional General
Rules of the PRC for the Organization of People's
Mediation Committees, art. 3; English translation in
OFFENCES

J. COHEN, supra note 21, at 124.
152

For the current version of this legislation, see

The Statute for Mediation in Villages and Towns, in Lin
Chi-tung (ed.), supra note 138, 303-04.
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This brief excursus concerning the criminal
process in Taiwan does not do justice to the
overall sophistication of the ROC legal system,
which seems to have used coercive measures
against a far smaller number of political dissidents than the PRC and which evidences in all
branches of government much greater concern
for the technical legal problems that such measures entail. I hope that these remarks not
only present some comparative perspective on
mainland developments but also will stimulate
much-needed research into the administration
ofjustice in Taiwan. In any event they provide
a bridge to our final section, which offers an
overview and some thoughts about the future.
IX
Taking another look at the criminal process
in the People's Republic over a decade after
my first look, I am more struck than ever by its
continuities with China's imperial tradition.
The PRC's creation of a semi-official substructure that is closely integrated with the official
structure to form a single sanctioning system is
itself an extrapolation of the traditional imperial process that linked, albeit in a looser way,
village, clan, guild and other social groups to
the mandarin magistracy. 153 Observers have
resorted to a variety of terms to characterize
the network of contemporary social units, such
as rural production brigades, urban residents'
committees and factory workshops, that play a
major role in administering justice. These have
been called "informal,"154 "internal,"1 55 "mass
mobilization"156 or "societal"1 57 institutions as
distinguished from the "formal," "external,"
"bureaucratic" or 'jural" sanctioning apparatus
to which analyses of foreign legal institutions
ordinarily confine themselves. Whatever the
terminology used by scholars and whatever
their appraisal of the relative importance of
the two components of the system during a
given period, all scholars acknowledge this link
between past and present, even while debating
its precise nature.
153 For an analysis of the Ch'ing or Manchu dynasty's social and legal systems, see S.VAN DER Ss'R.NKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA
1

(1962).

" See J. COHEN supra note 21, ch. 2, Informal
Adjustment and Sanctioning.
155
See Li, supra note 32, at 72.
156 See Lubman, supra note 32, at 566.
57
1
See Shao-chuan Leng, The Role of Law in the
People's Republic of China As Reflecting Mao Tse-tung's
Influence, 68J. CRIM. L. & C. 356 (1977).

Despite some significant differences between
the current "formal" criminal process and its
Manchu predecessor, their similarities in the
handling of serious offenses are overwhelming.
To be sure, the traditional system published a
comprehensive criminal code and required judicial officials to write reasoned opinions applying and elaborating upon it.' Yet the presumption of guilt, the absence of counsel or
other assistance for the accused, the long detention, the coercive environment, the lack of
a privilege against self-incrimination and the
inadequate opportunity to make a defense are
as noticeable today as they were almost two
centuries ago. The PRC's recent abolition of
the procuracy adds to the similarity between
present and past. What Professor Shuzo Shiga
has written of the task of the Manchu judge
seems equally applicable to the ex parte interrogations by Communist police officials and judicial workers that generally substitute for formal
trials in the PRC:
On the assumption that the truth regarding a
certain action was best known to the perpetrator
of the action, the duty of the judge became to
win over the offender and have him tell the
truth in his own words. Therefore, what was
required of a judge was the ability to fathom the
inner workings of human nature, rather than
adherence to legal procedure. 59'Is the future likely to witness significant
change in China's criminal process? Here the
Nationalist experience on Taiwan is suggestive.
In the early 1960's, economic development and
educational progress began to erode traditional
authoritarian ideas that exalted the interests of
the state over those of the individual.16 0 This
stimulated popular demands for securing individual rights against arbitrary state power, and
some government officials and intellectuals
who cooperate with the government supported
these demands. As a consequence, an attempt
was made to revise the ROC code of criminal
procedure to bring it closer to Anglo-American
conceptions. This effort might have come to
naught had not the ROC and the United States
in 1965 concluded an agreement on the legal
1

See D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 94.

159 Shuzo Shiga, Criminal Procedure in the Ch'ing

Dynasty, 2 THE ToYo BUNKO 123 (1975).
160 This paragraph is based upon Lung-sheng tao,
Reform of the Criminal Process in Nationalist China, 19
AM.J. OF CoMp. L. 747 (1971).
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status of American forces stationed in Taiwan. 61 Because that agreement guaranteed a
variety of due process protections to American
servicemen suspected of having committed
crimes within ROC jurisdiction, it was bitterly
attacked as an "unequal treaty" by Chinese
whose government denied them similar protections.
To placate the public, the ROC revised the
code of criminal procedure to grant its own
nationals certain American-style pre-trial safeguards, restraining police power to arrest,
search, detain and interrogate suspects .

6

De-

spite these new formal restrictions in the code
of criminal procedure, however, ROC police
remained largely unfettered because they continued to avail themselves of the opportunities
for inquisitorial investigation presented by the
' 63
Law for the Punishment of Police Offenses, 6 4
the Regulation for the Control of Hooligans,' 6
and the Measure for the Reform of Rebels' '
'
Nevertheand other martial law legislation. 66
less, within the bounds permitted by the ROC's
authoritarian dictatorship, ferment over reform of the criminal process persists, reflecting
"a complex value system in Taiwan, one that is
combined with a totalitarian conception of social control, liberal demands by the [articulate]
segments of the society, as well as traditional
beway[s] of thinking about the relationship
67
tween the state and the individual .'

Although the mainland regime does its best
to prevent us from learning whether similar
tensions exist in the People's Republic, it would
be a mistake to assume that they do not. The
1956-57 campaign to "Let a Hundred Flowers
Bloom" revealed unexpectedly broad dissatisfaction with the administration of justice, at
least among the educated. 6 It would be surprising if the subsequent widespread abuses of
the criminal process, especially during the antirightist movement of 1957-58, the Great Leap
161 Status of United States Armed Forces in the
Republic of China, Aug. 31, 1965, 1 U.S.T. 373,
T.I.A.S. No. 5986 (1966); see note 15supra.

16' Lung-Sheng Tao, supra note 160, at 748, cites

Articles 93, 77, 128, 154 and 156 of the new code of
criminal procedure. For an English translation of
this 1966 code,see note 138supra.
16 See note 150supra.
164See note 141 supra.
161

See note 142 supra.
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See Lung-Sheng Tao, supra note 160, at 756.
Id.
See J. COHEN,supra note 21, at 14.
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Forward of 1958-59 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, had not magnified this feeling
and even caused ferment among "the masses,"
who are supposed to be consulted in every
case. My own interviews with former residents
of China indicate that many Chinese accused
would gladly resort to procedural safeguards if
the opportunity were offered.

69

Some Red

Guard newspapers published during the Cultural Revolution condemned arbitrary acts of
the political-legal organs. 17 More recently, demobilized soldiers have complained about illegal beating inflicted by the police and their
17
assistants. '

Factory workers have protested

against the unjust rape conviction of one of
their number.''

2

Co-workers in an organization

have intervened to save an innocent comrade
from imprisonment for allegedly seeking to
escape to Hong Kong. 17'3 And an unusually
long "large-character-poster" in Canton called
upon the Fourth National People's Congress to
plainly prescribe measures to punish the high
officials who committed the heinous crimes of
knowingly violating the law while enforcing it,
fabricating cases, using the public prosecution
to avenge personal grudges, establishing their
own jails and resorting to unrestrained corporal
punishment and murder.

174

169

Id. at 257-58, 294-95.
See, e.g., Kuo Chia-hung, I Accuse in CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS (March 22, 1967) (Kuo is from
170

Chenkiang Sericulture Industry, Kiangsu Province);
Li Keng-lien, in I Accuse, in a special issue on The
Chien Liang Case (1968) (published by the Joint Red
Comm. of the Construction System) (the article relates how an investigation of the author's husband's
alleged crime drove him to murder and suicide); The
True Story of the Chaili Case-A PoliticalPlotHatched by
the Peng Chen Clique is Exposed (June 24, 1967) (published by the Political-Legal Commune of the Peking
Political-Legal Institute). See also Hsieh Fu-chih's Denunciation of Lo Jui-ch'ing (the Minister of Public
Security's denunciation of his predecessor, early
1966, but no date or publisher).
M See MING PAO MONTHLY 98-99 (No. 112, 1975);
in Shao-chuan Leng, supra note 157, at n.59.
12 See China's "Masses" Hit Authorities Over Rape
Case, Washington Post, Aug. 16, 1976, at A8; cited in
Shao-chuan Leng, supra note 157, at n.56.
173See the interview cited in Shao-chuan Leng,
supra note 157, at n.56.
7 4
'
See Li I-che, Concerning Socialist Democracy and
Legal System, reproduced in 12 IssUES AND STUDIES

110, 145-46 (No. 1, 1976). For a general plea for
greater observance of human rights in China, see
the letter to President Carter allegedly written by a
disillusioned Shanghai intellectual, in Weintraub, An
inside view of China, 97 FAR EASTERN EcON. REv. 2829 (1977).
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It is interesting to note that the current
leaders' campaign to discredit the "gang of
four" has included charges that it gravely
abused the criminal process. In recounting how
the deposed leaders allegedly sought to conceal
their criminal past, the Party has claimed that:
They also sent people disguised as Red Guards
to ransack the homes of those in the know and
even had them arrested on trumped-up charges,
kept them in jail for a long time and cruelly
persecuted them to the point of murder to
prevent divulgence of their secrets. 17
Party officials recently arranged for a famous
opera star and member of the National People's
Congress to tell American journalists how the
"gang of four" detained her incommunicado
for three years of political investigation, subjecting her to the psychological intimidation of
"struggle sessions," middle of the night interrogations and forced confessions. 176 And, as
part of its effort to strengthen the state security
apparatus and build public confidence in it,
the Hua Kuo-feng government has accused the
"gang"of seeking to smash the public security,
the procuracy and the courts, of thinking up
"pretexts for grabbing people and locking them
up" and of "publicly agitating to use militia
forces to handle the people's internal contradictions in a vain attempt to impose fascist dicta177
torship.'
Despite the fact that both Confucianism and
Maoism have indoctrinated the Chinese people
in the belief that the interests of individuals
must inevitably be subordinated to those of
state and society, and despite the vast differences between China's conditions and those
that gave rise to the Western liberal tradition,
one cannot be certain that the Chinese people
will continue to tolerate the arbitrary exercise
of state power in all circumstances. To be sure,
the 1975 PRC Constitution, which was importantly influenced by the so-called radical faction
of the Communist Party that maintained Mao's
support, offered little comfort to those who
hope for greater safeguards of personal liberty.
Yet that product of political compromise re175Commentators of Renmin Ribao (People's
Daily), Hongqi (Red Flag) and Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), A Sinister Cabal of New and Old
Counter-Revolutionaries, 20

PEKING

REV. 35, 38 (No.

19, 1977).
176 Mathews, A Case of PoliticalPersecution, Wall St.
J., May 18, 1977, at 22.
177See Bonavia, supra note 121.

tained certain guaranties promulgated by its
predecessor, such as the right to be free of
arbitrary arrest and the right to complain
against violations of law by state officials, even
while eliminating previously prescribed modes
of implementing those guaranties. 78 Moreover, the ouster of the "gang of four" has
dramatically put an end to the espousal of
radical policies, at least for a time, and the
current leaders have taken pains to emphasize
the need to restore law and order and to
"improve rational rules and regulations," as
the late Chou En-lai repeatedly urged, in order
to modernize the country. 7 9 Of course, they
are careful to condemn the "counter-revolutionary revisionist line" of former President
Liu Shao-ch'i, who to Mao's distaste had advocated a Soviet-style legal system in the mid1950's and who, it is said, had sponsored some
irrational rules and regulations that had to be
abolished. 80 But the current campaign, which
is actually supported by many leaders who were
Liu's followers, focuses its attack upon those
whose slogan was "Smash all rules and regulations."
Thus in mainland China as well as Taiwan
the drive for modernization can be expected to
stimulate continuing pressure to reduce the
scope of arbitrary state power over the criminal
process. Moreover, the PRC, like the ROC and
other Chinese governments since the last years
of the Manchus, may find that external stimuli
are gradually reinforcing internally generated
pressures. The present concern over "human
rights," for example, is subjecting the PRC to
increasing foreign criticism of its administration ofjustice and other aspects of its treatment
of its own nationals, especially now that the
PRC is a full participant in the world commu8
nity.' '
Peking's rivals in Taipei and Moscow, although conscious that "human rights" is a twoedged sword that can be turned against them
as well, have sought political advantage by
enhancing foreign interest in the situation on
178See text accompanying notes 61-64, 133-37 supra.
179 For a recent interesting survey of the problem
of "rules and regulations," see Wang Che, The "Gang
of Four"Risked Anarchism, 20 PEKING REv. 23-26 (No.
14, 1977).
ISO
See, e.g., id.
1"1See, e.g., BAO RUO-WANG & CHELMINSKI, supra

note 23; Padoul, Droit et Ideologie en Chine, in AcTEs
3-8 (June-July 1975); Goldwater, supra note 29.
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the mainland. ROC propagandists never lose
an opportunity to charge PRC leaders with
having "wrongly imprisoned, tortured and
killed millions of their own people."' 2 The
USSR has condemned China's allegedly lawless
departure from the standards of "socialist legality" ever since the Sino-Soviet dispute be8 3

came public.1

Peking has sought to deflect the growing
foreign interest in human rights in China by a
variety of techniques. One technique is to divert
attention by indicting the USSR for: imposing
a "police tyranny" and "inquisitorial persecution" upon the Soviet people; frequently confining political dissenters in mental hospitals;
completely isolating them and depriving them
of all rights including an open trial; and sending more than a million other prisoners to
labor camps (after allowing them legal protections far greater than those available to their
counterparts in the PRC, it should be noted)."8 4
Another technique is to denounce "the socalled 'human rights' issue" as "nothing more
than a hypocritical farce" staged by the rival
superpowers, "a regular slanging match with
each letting the other's skeleton out of the
closet."'8 5 A third technique is to claim that
China "is the country where human rights are
best observed," as "a responsible official" in
the Chinese Foreign Ministry recently did.
More than ninety-five percent of the Chinese
people enjoy human rights, the diplomat maintained, and the rest can also "if they are receptive to re-education." He stated that in the
United States, by contrast, only five percent of
the population enjoyed human rights, and in
the USSR not merely intellectuals but also
workers and peasants were oppressed. "So if
you criticize China on this point, we think it is
8 6
ridiculous," the official commented.
182 Chung Hua Jih Pao (China Daily News), May
11, 1977, as quoted in FREE CHINA WEEKLY, May 15,
1977, at 3.
183 See, e.g., Revolutionary Theory Is Guide to Action:
On the Dictatorshipof the Proletariat, Izvestia, May 17,
1964; translated in 16 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PRESS at 5; L. Gudoshnikov, Two Constitutions of the
People's Republic of China, 3 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

72-80 (1975).
" See Soviet "Psychiatric Hospitals" Prisons in Disguise, 20 PEKING REV. 20-22 (No. 11, 1977); Soviet
Concentration Camps, 19 PEKING REV. 15-16 (No. 10,

1976).
"Absurd Champion of "Human Rights," 20 PEKING
REv. 23-24 (No. 11, 1977).

' See Safire, supra note 37.
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The PRC will need more than skillful propaganda to meet this challenge of the world
community. The fact that it is now represented

in the United Nations means that it is caught
up in the slow but inexorable multilateral efforts to formulate international legal norms to
regulate nation-states' treatment of their own
nationals. Because it has long opposed UN
invocation of "human rights" as a means of
influencing China's domestic affairs, 187 even
while appreciating the opportunities that this
vehicle offers for influencing the domestic affairs of other states,' 8 the PRC has attempted
to tread carefully in what is becoming a legal
minefield.
Peking has not directly criticized the UN
General Assembly's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which proclaims, "as a common
standard of achievement for . . . all nations,"

principles including equality before the law,
the right to an effective judicial remedy for
violation of one's legal rights, freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention, the presumption of innocence, and the right to defend
one's self against criminal charges in a fair and
public trial by an independent and impartial
tribunal.' 89 Yet the PRC has never endorsed
the Declaration, despite the fact that the PRC
has accused the colonial and racist regimes of
southern Africa of violating it. 90 Peking's pretext for failing to endorse it is that, because the
ROC had participated in its adoption, the PRC
"reserved its right to comment on that Declas See, e.g., Ch'ien Szu, A Criticism of the Views of
Bourgeois International Law on the Question of Population, 5 Kuo-CHI WEN-T'I YEN-CHIU (Research on International Problems) 41-43 (1960); translated in
COHEN & CHIU, supra note 12, at 607-09; Cohen,
China and Intervention: Theory and Practice, 121 U. PA.
L. REV. 471, 479-81 (1973).
"' Kuo CH'UN, LIEN-HO-KUO (The United Nations) (1956); Special UN Security Council Meetings, 15
PEKING REV. 14-15 (No. 6, 1972).
189
See arts. 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Universal
Declaration, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR 7177, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The text may conveniently be found in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 30-34 (L.

Sohn &T. Buergenthal ed. 1973).
190For examples of such accusations, see U.N. Doc.
A/C. 3/SR. 1910, 17 (1972); Special UN Security Coun-

cil Meetings, supra note 157. I am grateful to Mr. Olin
L. Wethington, Harvard Law School 1977 and Columbia University Ph.D. candidate, for permission
to draw upon his unpublished paper China's Position
on InternationalLegal Norms On Human Rights Governing A State's Treatment Of Its Own Citizens (May, 1977).
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ration."' 91 The real reason, plainly enough, is
the inconsistency between the Declaration's
content and the norms applied by the PRC at
home. For the same reason Peking has failed
to comment on the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights, 192 which goes
beyond the Declaration in spelling out Westernstyle procedural guaranties.
Although the PRC has not chosen to sit in
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, it is
represented in both the Commission's parent
body, the Economic and Social Council, and
the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee of the General Assembly, as well as in
the Assembly itself. Thus it has had to react to
various human rights proposals that have come
before these bodies. Apart from questions of
colonialism and apartheid, Peking generally
prefers to abstain or not even participate in the
voting and to be as silent as possible. For
example, it appears to have purposely absented itself from the Assembly's 1976 vote on
a resolution concerning the protection of hu93
man rights in Chile.
Nevertheless, it has voted for Assembly resolutions that condemn torture on the basis of
the Universal Declaration, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
94
other internationally articulated standards. i
Yet the PRC has opposed most Assembly efforts to call upon states to: report laws and
administrative and judicial measures that prohibit torture; give urgent attention to developing an international code of ethics for law
enforcement agencies; and approve the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners adopted by the First U.N. Congress
on the Prevention of Crimes and the Treatment
of Offenders, which guarantees an accused the
presumption of innocence, the right to be informed of the charges and a proper opportunity to make a defense. 195
See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 2068, 23 (1974).
G. A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
G~
52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); also in SOHN &
'9'

BUERGENTHAL,

supra note 189, at 44-62.

193See UN Press Release GA/5571, Dec. 29, 1976,

at 232, concerning Resolution 31/124, Dec. 16, 1976,
on Protection of Human Rights in Chile.
194See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3059, 28 U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/PV 2163 (1973) (unanimously adopted);
G.A. Res. 3218, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31 U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974) (adopted without objection).
' See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 2071,

13 (1974), for

PRC reservations to draft Resolution 3218 in committee. See note 194 supra.

The PRC did not object to the Assembly's
adoption by acclamation of the "Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment," even
though that Declaration called upon states to:
provide appropriate training for law enforcement personnel; undertake systematic review
of interrogation practices; make criminal all
acts of torture; and establish complaint and
disciplinary procedures. 196 It is not clear
whether the PRC voted favorably or merely
abstained regarding an Assembly resolution
entitled "Human Rights in the Administration
of Justice,"' 97 but in committee Peking approved a draft version of the resolution despite
the fact that it indirectly called on states to
consider, when formulating national legislation, draft principles that are completely at
odds with those endorsed in China, such as an
independent judiciary, access to legal counsel,
the right to a defense and a privilege against
self-incrimination *198
It is difficult to reconcile the PRC's actions
on these last two resolutions with its general
sensitivity about international interference in
China's domestic affairs. To be sure, PRC
scholars have long maintained that General
Assembly resolutions are not legally binding
but merely recommendatory. 199 Yet this has
not prevented the PRC from opposing or not
taking a position on other resolutions that endorse principles contrary to those prevailing in
China. 00 It is possible to explain Peking's support for simple anti-torture resolutions on the
ground that their provisions are not inconsistent with the norms of China's criminal process.
196 G.A. Res. 3452,30 U.N. GAOR Supp. 34, U.N.
Doc. A/10034 (1975).
197 G.A. Res. 3144, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973) (adopted by a vote of 107 to 0,
with 20 abstentions).
' See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.2043, 42 (1973), which
reveals the PRC's favorable vote on the draft resolution contained in A/C.3/L. 2048.
199
See, e.g., K'ung Meng, A Criticism of the Theories
of Bourgeois InternationalLaw Concerningthe Subjects of
InternationalLaw and Recognition of States, in 2 Kuo-

CHI WEN-T'I YEN-CHIU (Research on International
Problems) 44-51 (1960); translated in COHEN & CHIU,

supra note 12, at 88, 97-98.
200
See text at notes 187 and 195 supra; Chou Kengsheng, The United Nations' Intervention in the Question
of Tibet Is Illegal, 6 CHENG-FA YEN-CHIU (PoliticalLegal Research) 8-11 (1959); translated in COHEN &
CHIU,supra note 12, at 1329-32.
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But this cannot explain Peking's acquiescence
in those parts of the 1975 Declaration that go
beyond simple condemnation of torture, and
surely the administration of justice resolution
is at odds with the PRC's domestic system.
Perhaps China did not wish to appear to be the
only country unprepared to endorse these humanitarian standards. In the case of China's
support in committee for -the administration of
justice resolution, perhaps the understaffed
PRC delegation to the U.N. lacked the expertise to understand the consequences of its action, or Peking may have been too eager to
oppose the USSR, which had urged postponement. 20 1 Whatever the explanation, enough has
been said to suggest that the People's Republic
is now enmeshed in a complex web of international negotiations that may heighten its sensitivity to the criminal process and add to the
pressures favoring increased protections for
the individual.
Nor is human rights the only topic of multilateral concern that bears upon the domestic
criminal process. Prior to the PRC's entry into
the U.N., the U.N. precluded the Peking regime from signing or acceding to the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" 2
and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. 20 3 In late 1975 the PRC quietly
acceded to the Diplomatic Convention," 4
thereby obligating itself to grant foreign diplomats an immunity from prosecution that the
PRC's practice under customary international
law has not always recognized .205 Adherence to
the Consular Convention would have an additional impact on the administration of justice.
For example, the PRC has long maintained
that, when a foreign national is detained on
See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.2043, 17 (1973).
For the text of this convention, see U.N. Doc.
A/CONF 20/13 (1961); 55 Am.J. INT'L. L. 1064 (1961).
203 For the text of this convention, see U.N. Doc.
A/CONF
25/12 (1963); 57 AM. J. INT'L. L. 995 (1963).
204
See U.N. SECRETARIAT, MULTILATERAL TREA201

202

TIES IN

RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

PERFORMS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS:

LIST OF SIGNA-

TURES,

AS OF DEC.

RATIFICATIONS,

ACCESSIONS,

31,

1975 ST/Leg/Ser. d/10, at 51.
105 See ForeignMinistry Protest Note, broadcast, New

China News Agency [N.C.N.A.] (Peking) (June 12,
1967), in F.B.I.S. (No. 114/67:BBB2-3, 1967) [hereinafter cited as N.C.N.A.]; Public Trial Convicts Indian
Embassy Spy, broadcast, N.C.N.A. (Peking) (June 13,
1967), in F.B.I.S. (No. 115/67:BBB2-4, 1967); reproduced in COHEN & CHIU, supra note 12, at 1004-07.
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criminal charges, it is consistent with customary
international law to deny his country's representatives access to him until all formal criminal
proceedings, including appellate review, have
run their course.2 06 This is contrary to the
Consular Convention, which requires the host
state to permit consular visits prior to the entry
of a judgment. 0 As the PRC's relations with
various countries develop, it may be pressed to
accede to the Consular Convention as well as
the Diplomatic Convention.
Of course, as early as 1952 the PRC recognized the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War 0° despite
the fact that that treaty makes applicable to a
state's criminal prosecution of protected persons due process standards that are clearly
inconsistent with China's administration of justice.20 9 When in 1973-74 Peking belatedlyjoined
in efforts to revise the POW treaty and related
conventions, its participation raised hopes of
increasing China's sensitivity to the criminal
justice provisions as well as other aspects of the
treaties. After 1974, however, the PRC did not
take part in the annual sessions of the diplomatic conference that has drafted texts to supplement the existing treaties.
In a curious way the enormous publicity that
the PRC has generated about the alleged crimes
of "the gang of four" focuses world interest
upon China's criminal process. None of the
previous Chinese leadership struggles so explicitly directed foreign attention to legal considerations. The handling of the case to date
206

See COHEN & CHIU, supra note 12, at 647-56.

See U.N. Doc. A/CONF,supra note 203, art. 36.
See On China's Recognition of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 1952 PEOPLE'S CHINA 33 (No. 15); reprinted in COHEN & CHIU, supra note 12, at 1123-24.
209 Article 84 of the convention requires trial by
a
court that offers "the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized."
Article 99 provides in part:
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted
on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to
admit himself guilty of the act of which he is
accused. No prisoner of war may be convicted
without having had an opportunity to present
his defence and the assistance of a qualified
advocate or counsel.
Article 103 states that in no circumstances can pretrial confinement exceed three months; and Article
105 prescribes detailed protections for the accused in
connection with trial. For a discussion of the relation
between the PRC's domestic legal system and the
POW convention, see Cohen, People's Republic of
China, in THE LAW OF WAR 233, 246 (Miller ed. 1975).
207
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demonstrates the extent to which the administration of justice in the PRC departs from the
world community's evolving notions of universal minimum standards. The accused have simply been detained incommunicado with no opportunity to defend themselves against the dossiers compiled and circulated against them,
even though, as we have seen, one of the
charges is that they subjected their political
opponents to the same kind of2incommunicado
10
detention that they now suffer.

Such ironies are lost upon the Party's current
leaders, who confront a genuine dilemma in
seeking to chart an appropriate way of disposing of the case. Is there to be a formal "show
trial" reminiscent of the Stalin purge trials of
the 1930s? A "mass trial" in the Chinese Communist tradition? Can Chiang Ch'ing and her
cohorts be relied upon to confess in public?
Can they be shown to the country and the
world after long months of intense interrogation? Would it leave a better impression to
confine them indefinitely without any form of
adjudication? Should the regime simply announce that they have been found guilty and
sentenced? There is no easy way out for the
victors, and the case seems sure to stimulate
further concern about China's criminal process,
both inside and outside the country.
210

See text at notes 175-77.

Over a decade ago, I wrote: "Perhaps the
least hazardous prediction one can make about
the criminal process at this juncture is that, as
long as Mao remains in power, we are unlikely
to witness any substantial improvement in the
plight of the individual in relation to the
state."2"' Now that Mao is gone, will such improvement take place? "Only the event will
teach us in its hour," but my own expectation
is that, just as internal and external pressures
have brought about certain formal procedural
protections for the individual on Taiwan, so
too will they eventually on the mainland. Yet
in the People's Republic, as in Taiwan, enhanced safeguards in the formal system are
not likely to make a significant impact upon
the overall process. The police and the Party,
supplemented by the military whenever public
order is seriously threatened, will continue to
enjoy sufficient flexibility to operate an essentially inquisitorial system. In both the PRC and
the ROC self-constituted governing elites are
determined not only to mobilize the people
and resources of a nation that has an authoritarian heritage but also to permit no challenge
to their rule. In these circumstances the prospects for major change in the criminal process
must remain modest.
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